IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION 05/022648/A01
BETWEEN
CHRISTINE MEYLER AS AN EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH PATRICK FERRIS (DECEASED)
Plaintiff/Respondent
and
JOSEPH FERRIS
Defendant/Appellant
CASE STATED
UNDER ARTICLE 62 (1) OF THE COUNTY COURTS (NI) ORDER 1980 IN RESPECT OF AN APPEAL TO THE HIGH COURT FROM A DECREE OF THE COUNTY COURT FOR THE DIVISION OF FERMANAGH AND TYRONE OF 30 MARCH 2007.
_____________________________________________________________________
SKELETON ARGUMENT OF EVIDENCE BY DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
1.I accompanied my late father Charles Ferris (deceased 9th October 2005) on all his consultations with solicitor Mr. James Montague from lodging an objection at Land Registry against Folio 2974 in response to advertisement dated 8th October 1986.
2.My late father outlined to solicitor James Montague, that comparable persons to himself, i.e. ‘the eldest son’ inherited the farm of land as of inheritance right. And from the death of his father in 1945, this applied to himself. I remember James Montague explaining that as now we had ‘direct rule’ the 1925 Land Registration Act of England applied and ‘the eldest son’ no longer was entitled to inherit the farm of land.
3.My late father explained as to how from 1945 to the death of his mother in 1962, he performed all the functions of ‘full owner’ with respect to all aspects of ownership. His sister Ellen Dolan (nee Ferris) remained at home, but she was in receipt of money from her husband Tom Dolan in USA and there was always a possibility of Ellen leaving and going to live with her husband. My father’s other two sisters, Mary Ferris, (deceased 1975) and Bridget Ferris (deceased 2005) worked out in various jobs in Omagh and took little or no part in farming. My late father also explained how his brother Joseph Ferris, lived in Belfast and worked there as a male nurse. My late father explained how a Mr Joe Harding, had lodged in the family home from 1950 and he was treated as ‘one of the family’ and actually purchased the adjoining farm for and on behalf of the Ferris family in 1962.
4.My late father had an ‘exceptional’ memory for local history and unfortunately, many of the meetings with solicitor James Montague, would also have included a wide range of historical events. An example, was the gruesome murder of a Barrister O’Donnell opposite the Court House in Omagh by an ‘aggrieved farmer’ called McCrossan from ‘Dregish, County Tyrone’ either at the end of the 1800s or beginning of 1900s. I recall, my late father outline, how Mr. McCrossan, was a ‘powerful build of a man’ who had attached a very long handle to a ‘gaffe for killing salmon’ and as barrister O’Donnell walked past the shop window, Mr McCrossan, who was occupying an upstairs room used the ‘gaffe’ and hooked barrister O’Donnell by the throat and lifted the barrister off his feet until he bled profusely and fell to his death on the pavement below.
5.My late father had consultations with a barrister, I believe his name was ‘McRae’ (a very thin delicate man) on two occasions at Omagh Court House in early 1989. My late father provided extensive detail of all the children of Anne Ferris deceased 1925 and how the Land Registry affidavits of Bridget Ferris, Joseph Ferris and Joe Harding, contained many ‘false statements’. My late father also explained how Mr. Harding had apologised for the ‘false statements’ saying that he made his affidavit under pressure from Bridget Ferris, who begged him on her knees to do so as she felt her life was in danger from her brother Joe Ferris.
6.I attended with my late father at Omagh Court on 30th May 1989, in response to a letter from solicitor James Montague dated This was incredible given the FACT that the case was Adjourned on 5th May AND Mr. Montague had written a one line letter to my father Charles Ferris on Tuesday 9th May 1989. Dear Mr Ferris, We would advise that your case has been adjourned until Tuesday 30th June 1989. Yours faithfully J. McNulty & Co.
7.My late father and I arrived early for the above court hearing on 30th May 1989. However, I became alarmed at approx 9.45am as neither solicitor James Montague nor barrister ? McCrea were in the court. At this time Omagh Courthouse was like ‘Fort Knox’ with the level of RUC security, I had to seek permission on three occasions to phone Mr. James Montague, but I was unable to speak with Mr. Montague. I left frantic messages with the office staff and solicitor James Montague arrived in Omagh Court at approx 10.15am. My late father asked about the barrister and solicitor James Montague explained that his office had made an administration error and ‘he had forgotten about the court case’. My father instructed to make an application for an adjournment.
8.At the opening of the court hearing, solicitor James Montague, asked for an adjournment, but this was ‘forcefully’ rejected by barrister Fitzpatrick for the Plaintiff’s. The County Court Hearing proceeded under these conditions, with barrister Fitzpatrick outlining, that solicitor James Montague, was ‘quite capable’ of defending the case.
9.The hearing continued from approx 10.45 to approx 12.30pm. The atmosphere in the hearing was ‘very hostile’ and Judge Babbington warned Joseph Ferris and my father on several occasions regarding their ‘verbal outbursts’ eventually, Judge Babbington, stated that the next ‘interruption’ would result in a ‘charge of contempt of court’ and exclusion from the hearing. At approx 12.30pm Judge Babbington, stated ‘the court will recess to I believe 1.30pm’.
10.At approx 1.30 pm barrister Fitzpatrick, began to provide more detailed ‘legal argument’ namely around issues such as ‘the defendant Charles Ferris, should not be in court today, has no rights to be in court, etc. etc.
11.After approx five minutes, Judge Babbington asked barrister Fitzpatrick, “How are you going to deal with the ‘inheritance rights’ of Charles Ferris the objector?” Barrister Fitzpatrick, provided a detailed ‘legal preamble’ with respect to ‘no entitlement’ and Judge Babbington asked the same question again saying, “I am asking you this for the second time?” Barrister Fitzpatrick again provided a detailed ‘legal preamble’ with respect to ‘no entitlement’. Judge Babbington, then stated, “I am going to ask you for the third and final time, how are you going to deal with the ‘inheritance rights’ of Charles Ferris, the objector?” Barrister Fitzpatrick, made no reply and after a few minutes, Judge Babbington stated, “Application Dismissed and No Order as to Costs.”
12.After the hearing outside the entrance to the courthouse, my late father ‘thanked and congratulated solicitor James Montague’ James Montague, rebutted these and said, “You did not do yourself any favours in there!”. My late father asked for details, but none were provided. At a consultation with solicitor James Montague in his office some 15 minutes later, James Montague, accepted a telephone call from solicitor Christine Meyler, and we could hear her raised voice, but could not make out any words distinctly. Solicitor, James Montague, explained after the telephone call, ‘business must go on’. My late father asked as to what would happen now and solicitor James Montague stated, “there will most likely be an appeal to the High Court, ‘this case is costing Bridie a lot of money’ with an appeal to the High Court.” My late father replied, “it doesn’t need to cost Bridie any money, if she will write to me and give me an apology for ‘treating me like a black sheep’ I will then call and see Bridie, as I never had an argument or disagreement with her in my life?”
13.It is my recollection that on Saturday 24th June 1989, that I received a telephone call from my mother stating, “we thought you might have been up last night, there is a letter to your father from Montague about a settlement,” I called up and my late father and I discussed about the prospects of a settlement. My late father was still insistent, that he required ‘a letter of apology’ and after some persuasion agreed for me to make an appointment with James Montague.
14.It is my recollection, that I was able to arrange the appointment for one day in the week commencing 26th June 1989. During this meeting solicitor James Montague stated, “Charlie, there is an offer, but I think you will not agree with it, there is an offer of seven ninths to Bridie and two ninths to you and your brother Joe is withdrawing any legal claim,” My late father expressed his surprise at his brother Joe withdrawing his legal claim and mentioned the ‘hostile’ exchanges during the court hearing on 30th May 1989. My late father again said, “I told you before and I told my son on the way here, I will not accept any settlement, until I get a letter of apology,” Solicitor James Montague, then stated, “I will send a letter of refusal, but to keep us both right, will you sign that the offer has been put to you,” My father agreed and signed the document, after a few minutes, I asked, “can I see the offer?” and solicitor James Montague provided me with the document, I read over the offer and then said, “I would be afraid, in case your letter of refusal and the signed document, become separated, I think you should also write across the document, ‘offer refused’ or words to that effect?” Solicitor James Montague, wrote some form of words across the document, using his fountain pen, I remember, James Montague, saying “Joe’s happy now Charlie!” I believe, I then explained to James Montague that I was intending to buy a house near Altnagelvin in Derry and Mr. Montague agreed to take my business.
15.I explained to my late father that I would enquire of James Montague on a regular basis, with regard to any future offers or any appeals to the High Court, saying “this will kill two birds with the same stone,” I provided the details of my house purchase to solicitor James Montague in August 1989 and completed the purchase in November 1989, with all bills being paid in December 1989. In early 1990, my wife Attracta, was involved in a car accident in Derry and I persuaded her to engage James Montague, but her dealings were mainly with Mr. Cathal Murray. I believe this case was settled in 1991 and again I kept contact with Mr. Montague and frequently asked as to the progress of my late father’s case. Mr. Montague, would usually respond, “the situation is at stalemate, I can’t get a barrister to take the case, because of the length of time and all the complications,”. I recall that in December 1992, I contacted solicitor James Montague, on behalf of my father as Bridget Ferris, had come to live with my brother Charles Ferris, as she stated, “Joe has threatened to kill me, and he is going to burn the house to the ground,” I remember, Mr. Montague stating to me, “your father will be delighted now,” I replied, “my father is not delighted, he is very concerned about Bridie’s safety,” I requested a home visit by Mr. Montague, but this did not take place, because there was a snow storm and Mr. Montague said he would not risk driving up into the hills.
16.I believe, Bridie Ferris remained with my brother Charles until after Christmas and then returned either end of January 1993 or early February 1993. My late father was still extremely concerned about Bridie’s safety and at a consultation with Mr. James Montague a ‘warning letter’ was sent to Joe Ferris. I did not enquire further after the letter from James Montague dated 27th January 1993, which states; ‘We think that these matter should now be resolved between the members of the family themselves.’ Apart from asking James Montague, as to how to frame a letter, as there was no ‘verbal contact’. James Montague, suggested writing the words ‘Without Prejudice’ at the top of any letter and this was the first time, I became aware of these words and their significance.
17.From December 1993 to May 1994, Bridie Ferris, resided with my brother Charles again because of ‘concerns for her safety’. On 20th May 1994, Bridie Ferris, provided a ‘Power of Attorney’ for my late father, but when solicitor Christine Meyler, visited some days later, solicitor Christine Meyler, refused to accept my father to act as ‘power of attorney’.
18.My late father, my brother Charles and I met with Mr. Gibson at Land Registry around 1997 during this meeting Mr. Gibson stated that he ‘accepted’ that there was some ‘fraudulent aspects’ in the registration of Folio 2974 in May 1994.
19.Letter from Land Registry dated 17th June 2002 states; ‘I would again point out that two separate applications to Land registry are involved in this matter. The first in 1986, to which you refer in your second paragraph of your letter of 15th May, relates to an application under Section 53 of the Land Registration Act (NI) 1970, being a claim to ownership of the land by way of ‘adverse possession’. The application was objected to by your father and was accordingly referred to the County Court for decision. The County Court dismissed the application and accordingly the application was dismissed by Land Registry.
20.Letter from Land Registry dated 17th June 2002 also states; A second separate application was made in May 1994, which has nothing to do with the prior application made in 1986, some 8 years previous. This application was made by way of an Assent executed by the personal representatives of the registered owner and registration was carried out in accordance with the terms of the Assent. Again, I would refer you to the provisions of Article 18 of the Land and Deeds Order 1992, which is the law under which Land Registry is required to operate in this matter. It is not up to Land Registry, as I have stated, to question the authority of the personal representatives or their request for registration. Once again I would point out that this is a totally different application from the one which was referred to the county Court and which was dismissed and which was made some 8 years previous to 1994. Copy of Article 18 of the Land and Deeds Order 1992
21.I carried out my own independent search of the Public Records Office in Northern Ireland in late December 2006 and I became very concerned to find that there had been ‘fraudulent practice’ by the personal representatives of Anne Ferris deceased 1925. the Oath was sworn by Bridget Ferris & Joseph Ferris on 18th May 1994 and administered by a solicitor in the office of R. H. O’Connor & Company, Solicitors Omagh. I am able to prove ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ that this ‘Oath’ was fraudulent and pejorative, as detailed below. The following extract from the enclosed ‘Oath’ is very significant in relation to the fraudulent and pejorative content as detailed below. (c) a widow, leaving Patrick Ferris, John Ferris, James Ferris, Joe Ferris, Thomas Ferris, Charles Ferris. Catherine Ferris and Ellen Ferris her lawful and only children and only next of kin all of whom have since died and without grandchild or other descendant the issue of a predeceased child her surviving, that we are the Administrators of the personal estate of the said Charles Ferris under Grant of Administration dated 12.12.1985 granted forth of the District Registry at Londonderry. The above extract from the ‘Oath’ is incorrect and is at variance with the fact that there were 33 ‘grandchildren’ of Anne Ferris.
22.It is my understanding that “Perjury is the "willful and corrupt taking of a false oath in regard to a material matter in a judicial proceeding". As this ‘false oath’ was then provided to Royal Courts of Justice Belfast for the purpose of Bridget Ferris and Joseph Ferris becoming the personal representatives of Anne Ferris deceased 1925. The letter dated 2 January 2007 from ‘The Master Probate Office’ Royal Courts of Justice, states: ‘It is impossible for the office to verify the content of each application. Indeed the office is entirely dependant on the solicitors lodging the application to ensure the factuality of the content of the application. The oath document which contains all the relevant detail in relation to entitlement to the grant is a sworn document and as such will be taken by the office as a statement of fact (provided it is completed properly). (Stephen Watson 2nd January 2007)
23.I believe that on the evidence of ‘fraudulent practice’ and the evidence of ‘perjury’is sufficient cause for the County Court to ‘Set Aside’ the Registration of Folio 2974. on the basis that the Oath has therefore been incorrectly attested and on foot thereof, an illegal Assent was presented to Land Registry in May 1994 for the ‘Invalid Registration’ of Folio 2974.
24.I believe that information provide to me by my daughter Sinead Ferris after performing an Internet Search indicated that Mr Sean Magee Solicitor in office of Rodgers & Co may not have been providing a robust ‘interrogation’ of the ‘deceptive legal’ position of the ‘Plaintiff’ due to his past criminal record.
25.Judge David McFarland at Dungannon County Court stated:- “I have some concerns about the Assent executed in 1994. Section 34(2) of the Administration of Estates Act (NI) 1955 provides that “a personal representative may execute an assent vesting any estate or interest in .. land in the person entitled thereto”. Section 34 (1)(b) defines a “person entitled” as including “the persons or person (…) who (whether by devise, bequest, devolution, appropriation or otherwise) may be beneficially entitled to that estate or interest” The duty of any personal representative is to ensure that the person in whom they vest the interest of the deceased, is the person properly entitled to the interest. In this case the personal representatives appear to have assumed that the title in the land passed to the descendants of Charles, as Charles had acquired ownership in the land. Such ownership could not be by way of devise, bequest, devolution, or appropriation, so would have to fall into the “otherwise” category. After the County Court had rejected a s.53 application it is perhaps inappropriate for Bridget and Joseph P. to decide that Bridget is the person entitled to 7/9th of the estate, given that her entitlement under intestacy would have been as little as 1/24th (increasing to 1/12th if Joseph P’s interest is added.)”
26.Judge David McFarland also stated:- “I remain concerned about the title that the proposed purchaser (vendor?) can offer to any prospective purchaser. Her title derives firstly from the assent and then from the transfer, by way of gift, and finally as personal representative. Referring to the English 1925 Act (the equivalent to our 1955 Act), Snell’s Equity (13th Edition) states:”An assent….is to be taken as “sufficient evidence” that the person in whose favour the assent…is given or made is the person entitled to have the legal estate conveyed to him….but it is not otherwise to affect prejudicially the claim of any person rightly entitled to the estate…” It further states “Sufficient evidence” is not the same as “conclusive evidence”; a purchaser accordingly cannot rely on an assent if, on a proper investigation of title, facts come to his knowledge which indicate that the assent was not made in favour of the person rightfully entitled. The simple enquiry concerning the assent will alert any purchaser to a potential difficulty. A court sanctioned sale may operate to lull a prospective purchaser into a false sense of security into such an investigation of what would appear to be a defective devolution of the legal estate.”
27.Judge David McFarland also stated:- “In the circumstances I restrict my ruling in this case to a determination as to parties’ rights to such interest as Charles Ferris (Senior) may have had in the land comprised in the folio. His Honour Judge McFarland 30 March 2007.
28.Judge David McFarland also stated:- “The evidence of Joseph Ferris cannot be regarded as being particularly accurate. I use this neutral term, as I am uncertain as to whether he has simply lied, has fantasised about this case, or, as a result of his unhealthy obsession with the case, has rejected in his own mind any possible set of facts which contradict his version of what could have happened. Whatever the reason, he cannot be regarded as a witness of truth. He has already lied to the police about the alleged forgery, and, in my view, gave blatantly inaccurate evidence to the court. His assertion that as a member of the nursing profession he is bound to tell the truth does not require comment from me.”
29.I am still waiting for Judge David McFarland to register his concerns with The Nursing & Midwifery Council, the Regulatory Body for my profession, i.e. Registered Nurse.
30.At the commencement of my contacts with solicitor James Montague and other solicitors in October 1986, I had 100% ‘blind-faith’ in the legal profession. I now have minus 100% if that is possible, the ‘blatant corruption’ in my late father’s case and with my contact almost on a daily basis with ‘Victims of the Legal Profession’ from all over Ireland and through the website www.crookedlawyers.com and www.rateyoursolicitor.com from all corners of the English speaking world. I do not have any expectations of getting justice and from reading the brief extracts from the following four books by authors in Australia, there is little prospect of justice in these Islands, with some prospect, perhaps in the European Court of Human Rights.
http://flac.htmlplanet.com/news/books03oct04.htm Those interested in substantive legal reform ... should find the following books of much interest
LAWYERS OR GRAVE ROBBERS? by Diarmuid Hannigan (www.lawyersorgraverobbers.com)
Diarmuid Hannigan a well-known Melbourne business man has awards for export achievement and innovative business practice. Born in Africa, Diarmuid shares in the dream of all who have come to this country - of a fair society that gives a fair go. Imagine his horror when everyday family matters turn into a nightmare of Privilege - yes, with a capital P. Read his story of an encounter with the Australian legal system and share his nightmare. It could happen to you..
Diarmuid Hannigan - not exactly your average client – scrutinises the conduct of a self-serving lawyer who is neither fair nor reasonable. In doing so the author reveals a profession that shuns transparency and accountability then calls upon his engineering qualifications and business experience to show a better way.
Flac (For Legally Abused Citizens)
A lawyer in charge of an estate uses apparently lawful obstructionism to deny beneficiaries their inheritance, so creating a situation which results in a costly and unnecessary dispute. The family suffers and the lawyers fees deplete the value of the estate. Lawyers or Grave Robbers? exposes fundamental flaws in the legal system and questions prevailing legal ethics.
Peter Andrew (Legal System Reform Advocate)
"...many legal outcomes can be explained, and future cases predicted, by asking a very simple question: is there a plausible legal result in this case that will significantly affect the interests of the legal profession (positively or negatively)? If so, the case will be decided in the way that offers the best result for the legal profession."
Associate Professor Benjamin Barton. University ofTennesee College of
Law (Alabama Law Review, December 2007)
'THE CARTEL' Lawyers and Their Nine Magic Tricks.
by Evan Whitton
First published 1998 ISBN 0 646 34887 6 Available worldwide from:
www.ewhitton.com and distributed in Australia by:- Tower books 19 Rodborough Road, Frenches Forest NSW 2086
Phone 02 9975 5566 Fax 02 99755 5599
In this remarkably well-researched work, Evan Whitton, lecturer in journalism at Queensland University, author and one of Australia's leading investigative journalists draws upon history and contemporary issues to challenge the adversary system of justice and the self-serving profession in whose interests it was created.
In doing so, Whitton uses humour, incisive observation and a no-holds-barred approach in his disembowelment of a fraternity that for the most part serves the rich and those with the appropriate social connections.
In "The Cartel" the author has given us what is probably the most significant contribution towards understanding the failures and corruption within civil and criminal jurisdictions. And because lawyers dominate the legal and political process it inevitably brings into question the quality of our democracy or if indeed it exists at all.
'THE EVIL DEEDS OF THE RATBAG PROFESSION' In the Criminal Justice System. by Brett Dawson
Published 1998 Available from Brett S. Dawson EMail: bsdawson@bigpond Fax: 07 5442 2373
An outstanding and uncompromising insider's evaluation of the criminal justice system:
In highlighting the gulf between the law and justice Brett Dawson calls upon 30 years experience as a prosecutor, defence lawyer, property lawyer, civil litigation lawyer, professional trainer of law graduates and law lecturer.
Dawson, like Whitton, uses court decisions and court practices from all over the English speaking world to demonstrate that because the legal process is not about seeking the truth it is fundamentally flawed. Defence lawyers can hide the truth under "legal professional privilege", vilify victims and get away with lying to compliant judges.
Dawson analyses what has gone wrong and why. The profession is constantly telling us that with all its faults we have the best system of justice, a state of affairs hard to validate when compared to the European model or measured against the disturbing facts arraigned before us by Evan Whitton and Brett Dawson.
TRIAL BY VOODOO; how the Law defeats justice and democracy.
by Evan Whitton
Published 1994 by Random House Australia ISBN 0 09 182880 5
The premise of this book is quite simple: Our legal system does not provide us with justice and true democracy because it does not set out to establish the truth, and punish the guilty. The heart of the problem is that the system refuses to accept that judges and juries are able to cope with the direct truth - or the reporting of it by journalists.
In Trial by Voodoo, Evan Whitton draws on years of reporting law, crime, corruption - and our whole apparatus of power - to describe what really happens in our legal system: trials, judicial investigations, Royal Commissions, etc. And he brings to life the history and great characters (on both sides of the process) and shows how they, at varying times, make the system work for them.
Evan Whitton makes a powerful case for a greater openness in legal procedure - and free and open reporting by journalists. In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court: "One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public should know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what happens there, to the end that the public may judge whether our system of justice is fair and right."
For worthwhile change to occur it is important to first know what is wrong. Evan Whitton, Brett Dawson, and Diarmuid Hannigan have courageously shown the way.
31.If having read these extracts, I later received by e-mail from Diarmuid Hannigan an electronic copy of Serial Liars, How the Lawyers get the money, another book by Evan Whitton, which I send by attachment for all ‘high and mighty’ lawyers to refute.
32.Justice Hart in his judgement states at:- ‘[21] (3) Was Charles Ferris as the eldest son on Charles Ferris Senior entitled by operation of law to the lands upon the death intestate of his father on 15 November 1945?’
At the time of the death of Charles Ferris (senior) intestate on the 15th day of November 1945, his eldest son Charles Francis Ferris (my father) was entitled to the real property as stated: ‘The enactment currently governing distribution on intestate deaths is the Administration of Estates Act (NI) 1955.
This Act is effective for deaths occurring on or after 1st January 1956. DEATHS BEFORE 1956 Real Property Subject to the above provisions of the Intestates’ Estates Act 1890, realty passed to the heir-at-law subject to the widow’s right of dower or the widower’s right of curtsy.
Central to the inheritance laws for realty was the concept of ‘primogeniture’, which embraced the idea that the heir was generally a single person (unless two or more females were entitled in equal degree) rather than a class of next of kin. In establishing who was entitled as heir, the following principles were applied:
(a)In the first instance the heir was traced by descent through the direct line of the issue of the ‘last purchaser’ ad infinitum.
(b)Male relatives were preferred to female relatives in the same degree.
(c)If two or more persons in the same degree were males, the eldest only inherited.
(d)In the absence of males in any degree, females inherited as co-parceners.
(e)Lineal descendants inherited ad infinitum in place of their ancestor.
33.Initially a fee had not been capable of ascending, but this restriction was removed by the Inheritance Act 1833, and in the absence of descendants the heir was the nearest lineal ancestor, subject to the above rules and the rule that the father and his relatives were preferred to the mother and hers. Similarly, the father’s or mother’s paternal relatives were preferred to the father’s or mother’s maternal relatives.’ Grattan, S. (1996) Succession Law in Northern Ireland. SLS Legal Publication (NI) pages 109 – 113.
34.I would like the ‘Court of Appeal’ to ponder on this quote from Nelson Mandella. 'In Law and Philosophy, one asks, "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" (Who will guard the guardians themselves?) If the prefect does not obey the rules, how can the students be expected to obey? In effect the prefect was above the law because he was the law and one prefect was not supposed to report another.' (page 47, Nelson Mandela 1994, Long Walk to Freedom) I think Nelson Mandela 'hits the nail on the head' Solicitors, Barristers and Judges 'are above the law' because they are the law. In the 22 years that I have been involved in the 'Legal Corruption' as mentioned above and in my case history http://www.crookedlawyers.com/index.php . I have met many Solicitors, Barristers and Judges. I haven't met a single one (from October 1986 to February 2009) who could speak or write the words 'Truth and Justice'.
Skeleton Argument of Defendant/Appellant, Thursday 19th February 2009.
…………………………………..
Signature of Defendant/Appellant
Joseph Ferris, Nurse Lecturer, 14 Alanvale Crescent, Kilfennan Estate, L/Derry, Northern Ireland. BT47 5SJ.
35.Copy to Victims of the Legal Profession Website http://www.crookedlawyers.com/index.php
PS. As the Court of Appeal Hearing is on Monday 2nd March, I reckoned on posting to the Forum to keep people informed. J.F
Offline
Telephones: Bar Library
BELFAST: (028) 90241523 91 Chichester Street
FAX: (028) 90231850 BELFAST
BT1 3JQ
25th February 2009
FAO Appeals and Lists office
Dear Sirs,
RE: Christine Meyler as an executor of the Estate of Joseph Patrick Ferris (Deceased) v. Joseph Ferris
Please find enclosed herewith Skeleton Argument for the scheduled hearing on Monday 2nd March 2009, on behalf of the Plaintiff/ Respondent;
Yours sincerely
GARY McHUGH BL
Enc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
No 05/022648/A01
BETWEEN
CHRISTINE MEYLER
AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH PATRICK FERRIS (DECEASED)
Plaintiff/Respondent:
-and-
JOSEPH FERRIS
Defendant/Applicant:
____________________
CASE STATED
____________________
UNDER ARTICLE 62(1) OF THE COUNTY COURTS (NI) ORDER 1980 IN RESPECT OF AN APPEAL TO THE HIGH COURT FROM A DECREE OF THE COUNTY COURT FOR THE DIVISION OF FERMANAGH AND TYRONE ON 30th MARCH 2007
SKELETON ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
__________________
1. By way of a Case Stated dated 17th September 2008, Mr Justice Hart has posed three particular questions for this Court, the second question being reduced to three parts.
2. For the purposes of this argument, the Plaintiff/Respondent shall address each question in turn and answer the questions seriatim. In so addressing the questions posed by Mr Justice Hart, the Plaintiff/Respondent has considered the contents of a document entitled “Skeleton Argument of Evidence by Defendant/Appellant” dated 19th February 2009 and served on the Plaintiff/Respondent’s solicitor on 20th February 2009.
QUESTION 1:
3.0 “Was I correct in finding that the agreement of June 1989 was binding upon Charles Ferris, and therefore that he was only entitled to a 2/9th share of the lands?”
3.1 Answer:
It is submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff/Respondent that a determination of this question lies with the consideration of the oral evidence which was elicited at both the original County Court Hearing before His Honour Judge McFarland and upon appeal before Mr Justice Hart. It is submitted that no questions of law or legal argument pertain to a determination of the answer to this question as the factual matrix giving rise to the agreement of June 1989 was determined upon considering the evidence of Christine Meyler solicitor, James Montague solicitor and Mr Joseph Ferris. It is submitted that the overwhelming preponderance of evidence as concluded by His Honour Judge McFarland and Mr Justice Hart, was that there had been explicit and express agreement between the relevant parties to “split” the interest at folio 2974 in accordance with the agreement of the 20th June 1989. (See paragraph 9 and 10 of the Case Stated.)
4.0 QUESTION 2:
(i) Were the errors in the oath sworn in support of the application for a Grant of Letters of Administration in the estate of Ann Ferris capable of being regarded as fraudulent?
4.1 Answer:
The Plaintiff/Respondent replies that the “errors” are not capable of being regarded as “fraudulent”.
It is submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff/Respondent that where the Defendant/Appellant contends that the oath sworn by Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris were fraudulent, then the onus is on the Defendant/Appellant to prove the fraudulent nature of the same. It is submitted that in the course of the oral evidence brought before the Learned County Court Judge and subsequently before Mr Justice Hart, no evidence was led by or on behalf of the Defendant/Appellant which could remotely be construed as demonstrating fraud.
4.2 The Plaintiff/Respondent contends that where the Defendant/Appellant seeks to demonstrate “fraud”, he must prove, to a very high standard, that the conduct of Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris in the oaths sworn by them amounted to dishonesty. It is submitted for the purposes of this argument that dishonesty must incorporate the criminal test for the same as set down by the Court of Appeal in Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 and particularly page 1064 paras D – E.
4.3 The Defendant/Respondent contends that if the Court does not consider an absolute application of the criminal standard of dishonesty would be applicable for the purposes of answering the case stated, assistance may be gleaned from Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol 1 at page 998 as to what may constitute fraud or a fraudulent act for the purposes of the index proceedings.
4.4 In Stroud at page 998 it is submitted the Learned Author provides helpful examples and instances of what may constitute fraud and the Plaintiff/Respondent adopts the same and in particular the following:
“The Court has never ventured to lay down a general proposition, what should constitute fraud’, per Lord Eldon, LC. In Mortlock – v – Butler, 10 Ves. June 292 at 206. But it is ‘something dishonest and morally wrong’ per Wills J ex p Watson 21 QBD 301 and it is inconsistent with a claim of right made in good faith, however unfounded, The People (A-G) – v – Grey [1944] IR 326.”
4.5 It is submitted that there is no evidence or material to sustain any interpretation that the oaths sworn in both the application of a Grant of Letters of Administration in the estate of Anne Ferris is capable of being regarded as fraudulent.
5.0 QUESTION 2:
(ii) If so, what, if any, effect would such a finding have upon the Order I made dismissing the appeal?
5.1 Answer:
The Plaintiff/Respondent contends that even where a Court were to determine that the oath sworn as discussed above was fraudulent, this can have no effect on the central, substantive feature of this case, namely that the agreement of
June 1989 was made properly, in good faith and is binding on the parties and their heirs and successors. The circumstances giving rise to the oath sworn by Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris, it is submitted, are fundamentally extraneous to any determination of the substantive action and the prospective entitlements of the Plaintiff/Respondent and the Defendant/Appellant having regard to the subject lands.
5.2 QUESTION 2:
(iii) Even if the errors were not fraudulent, were they capable of affecting the validity of the subsequent assent?
5.3 Answer:
It is submitted that this question is answered in the negative as no feature of the oath can be seen to impact detrimentally, or otherwise, on the intention of the parties who swore the oath. By analogy with a Deed of Conveyance, the Plaintiff/Respondent asserts that where the oath may contain a false description, it does not prejudice its intended effect as reflected in the latin maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet. The Plaintiff/Respondent respectfully refers the Court to Wylie’s Irish Conveyancing Law (3rd Edition) page 615, para 17.24.
5.4 Mr Justice Hart adopted the analysis of Judge McFarland as set out on Paragraph 12 of Judge McFarland’s judgement which we say is a proper analysis of the position. In any event this is a matter capable of rectification, as suggested by Judge McFarland, by the chain of title being clarified. This clarification requires the registration of Charles Ferris Senior as Fee Simple owner of the Folio by adverse possession following his death. His wife Bridget then occupied the land until her death and the surviving children of Charles and Bridget came to an agreement on the division of the lands which has been found to be a valid and enforceable agreement (i.e. the June 1989 agreement).
6.0 Question 3
Was Charles Ferris as the eldest son of Charles Ferris Snr. entitled by operation of Law to the lands upon the death intestate of his father on 15th November 1945?
6.1 Answer:
Yes, for the reasons set out at Answer 2 (iii) above.
25th February 2009
Dermot Fee QC
Gary McHugh BL
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
NAME OF PROCEEDINGS: Christine Meyler as an executor of the estate of Joseph Patrick Ferris (Deceased) v. Joseph Ferris
PARTY PROVIDING THE LIST: The Plaintiff/ Respondent
NAME OF COUNSEL: Dermot Fee QC
Gary McHugh BL
CASES
1.* Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 (Page 1064, Paragraphs D-E)
TEXT BOOKS
1.* Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2009 (Page 384)
2.* Strouds Judical Dictionary (6th Edition) Vol. 1 (Page 998)
3. Wylies Irish Conveyancing Law, 3rd Edition.
STATUTES
1. Limitation (Northern Ireland) Order 1989.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Date Event
March 1901 Registration of subject lands in the name of Anne Ferris
1908 Partial Transfer of some of the Lands
4th September 1925 Anne Ferris dies an intestate Widow
25th November 1945 Death of Charles Ferris Snr.
6th April 1962 Death of Bridget Ferris, wife of Charles Ferris Snr.
12th December 1985 Letters of Administration granted to Bridget Ferris and Joseph P. Ferris.
May 1986 Bridget Ferris and Joseph P. Ferris make joint application to the Land Registry to be registered as joint registered owners of the Folio. Charles Ferris objects.
30th May 1989 Contested registration application considered before Omagh County Court and application of Bridget Ferris and Joseph P. Ferris dismissed.
June 1989 Agreement reached in relation to the division of the lands.
18th May 1994 Bridget Ferris and Joseph Ferris swear oath to extract a Grant of Letters of Administration (Intestate) in the estate of Anne Ferris.
31st May 1994 Assent created where Bridget Ferris and Joseph P. Ferris as Personal Representatives of Anne Ferris assent to the vesting in Bridget Ferris (as to7/9th share) and Charles Ferris (as to a 2/9th share) on the Land comprised in Folio 2974 County Tyrone.
15th December 1994 Bridget Ferris transferred by way of gift her 7/9th share to Joseph P. Ferris
16th September 1997 Charles Ferris transferred by way of gift his 2.9th share to Joseph Ferris.
15th May 2000 Joseph P. Ferris dies and Christine Meyler is appointed by his last will as his executor. Under this will he bequeaths his 7/9th share to his six children in equal shares.
7th June 2005 Equity Civil Bill (Partition Proceedings) issued.
7th October 2005 Notice of intention to Defend.
8th November 2005 Notice for Further and Better Particulars.
22nd November 2005 Defendant’s “Defence” and Counterclaim.
9th January 2006 Statement of Evidence on Behalf of the Defendant
23rd February 2006 Replies to Particulars
19th May 2006 Statement of Evidence on behalf of the Plaintiff
19th February 2007 County Court Hearing
30th March 2007 Judgement of His Honour Judge McFarland
23rd April 2007 Notice of Appeal
September/ October 2007 County Court Appeal Hearing
8th April 2008 Judgement of Mr. Justice Hart
17th September 2008 Case Stated by Mr Justice Hart
2nd March 2009 Court of Appeal Hearing.
LIST OF KEY PERSONS
Name Role
Anne Ferris Lands first registered in her name
Charles Ferris Snr. One of Anne Ferris’s 8 children
Bridget Ferris One of Charles Ferris Senior’s daughters
Joseph P. Ferris One of Charles Ferris Senior’s sons
Charles Ferris One of Chares Ferris Senior’s sons and father of the Defendant
Christine Meyler Plaintiff and Solicitor
Joseph Ferris Defendant/ Appellant
James Montague Charles Ferris’s former Solicitor
(Word Count 1,786) Friday 27th February 2009 J.F.
PS. This is the Counsel Argument for my opponent Solicitor Christine Meyler. J.F. Saturday 28th February 2008.
Offline
Telephones: Bar Library
BELFAST: (028) 90241523 91 Chichester Street
FAX: (028) 90231850 BELFAST
BT1 3JQ
26th February 2009
FAO Appeals and Lists office
Dear Sirs,
RE: Christine Meyler as an executor of the Estate of Joseph Patrick Ferris (Deceased) v. Joseph Ferris
Please find enclosed herewith amended Skeleton Argument for the scheduled hearing on Monday 2nd March 2009, on behalf of the Plaintiff/ Respondent;
Yours sincerely
GARY McHUGH BL
Enc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
No 05/022648/A01
BETWEEN
CHRISTINE MEYLER
AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH PATRICK FERRIS (DECEASED)
Plaintiff/Respondent:
-and-
JOSEPH FERRIS
Defendant/Applicant:
____________________
CASE STATED
____________________
UNDER ARTICLE 62(1) OF THE COUNTY COURTS (NI) ORDER 1980 IN RESPECT OF AN APPEAL TO THE HIGH COURT FROM A DECREE OF THE COUNTY COURT FOR THE DIVISION OF FERMANAGH AND TYRONE ON 30th MARCH 2007
SKELETON ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
__________________
1.By way of a Case Stated dated 17th September 2008, Mr Justice Hart has posed three particular questions for this Court, the second question being reduced to three parts.
2.For the purposes of this argument, the Plaintiff/Respondent shall address each question in turn and answer the questions seriatim. In so addressing the questions posed by Mr Justice Hart, the Plaintiff/Respondent has considered the contents of a document entitled “Skeleton Argument of Evidence by Defendant/Appellant” dated 19th February 2009 and served on the Plaintiff/Respondent’s solicitor on 20th February 2009.
QUESTION 1:
3.0“Was I correct in finding that the agreement of June 1989 was binding upon Charles Ferris, and therefore that he was only entitled to a 2/9th share of the lands?”
3.1 Answer:
It is submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff/Respondent that a determination of this question lies with the consideration of the oral evidence which was elicited at both the original County Court Hearing before His Honour Judge McFarland and upon appeal before Mr Justice Hart. It is submitted that no questions of law or legal argument pertain to a determination of the answer to this question as the factual matrix giving rise to the agreement of June 1989 was determined upon considering the evidence of Christine Meyler solicitor, James Montague solicitor and Mr Joseph Ferris. It is submitted that the overwhelming preponderance of evidence as concluded by His Honour Judge McFarland and Mr Justice Hart, was that there had been explicit and express agreement between the relevant parties to “split” the interest at folio 2974 in accordance with the agreement of the 20th June 1989. (See paragraph 9 and 10 of the Case Stated.)
4.0 QUESTION 2:
(i)Were the errors in the oath sworn in support of the application for a Grant of Letters of Administration in the estate of Ann Ferris capable of being regarded as fraudulent?
4.1 Answer:
The Plaintiff/Respondent replies that the “errors” are not capable of being regarded as “fraudulent”.
It is submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff/Respondent that where the Defendant/Appellant contends that the oath sworn by Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris were fraudulent, then the onus is on the Defendant/Appellant to prove the fraudulent nature of the same. It is submitted that in the course of the oral evidence brought before the Learned County Court Judge and subsequently before Mr Justice Hart, no evidence was led by or on behalf of the Defendant/Appellant which could remotely be construed as demonstrating fraud.
4.2The Plaintiff/Respondent contends that where the Defendant/Appellant seeks to demonstrate “fraud”, he must prove, to a very high standard, that the conduct of Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris in the oaths sworn by them amounted to dishonesty. It is submitted for the purposes of this argument that dishonesty must incorporate the criminal test for the same as set down by the Court of Appeal in Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 and particularly page 1064 paras D – E.
4.3The Defendant/Respondent contends that if the Court does not consider an absolute application of the criminal standard of dishonesty would be applicable for the purposes of answering the case stated, assistance may be gleaned from Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol 1 at page 998 as to what may constitute fraud or a fraudulent act for the purposes of the index proceedings.
4.4In Stroud at page 998 it is submitted the Learned Author provides helpful examples and instances of what may constitute fraud and the Plaintiff/Respondent adopts the same and in particular the following:
“The Court has never ventured to lay down a general proposition, what should constitute fraud’, per Lord Eldon, LC. In Mortlock – v – Butler, 10 Ves. June 292 at 206. But it is ‘something dishonest and morally wrong’ per Wills J ex p Watson 21 QBD 301 and it is inconsistent with a claim of right made in good faith, however unfounded, The People (A-G) – v – Grey [1944] IR 326.”
4.5It is submitted that there is no evidence or material to sustain any interpretation that the oaths sworn in both the application of a Grant of Letters of Administration in the estate of Anne Ferris is capable of being regarded as fraudulent.
5.0 QUESTION 2:
(ii)If so, what, if any, effect would such a finding have upon the Order I made dismissing the appeal?
5.1 Answer:
The Plaintiff/Respondent contends that even where a Court were to determine that the oath sworn as discussed above was fraudulent, this can have no effect on the central, substantive feature of this case, namely that the agreement of
June 1989 was made properly, in good faith and is binding on the parties and their heirs and successors. The circumstances giving rise to the oath sworn by Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris, it is submitted, are fundamentally extraneous to any determination of the substantive action and the prospective entitlements of the Plaintiff/Respondent and the Defendant/Appellant having regard to the subject lands.
5.2 QUESTION 2:
(iii)Even if the errors were not fraudulent, were they capable of affecting the validity of the subsequent assent?
5.3 Answer:
It is submitted that this question is answered in the negative as no feature of the oath can be seen to impact detrimentally, or otherwise, on the intention of the parties who swore the oath. By analogy with a Deed of Conveyance, the Plaintiff/Respondent asserts that where the oath may contain a false description, it does not prejudice its intended effect as reflected in the latin maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet. The Plaintiff/Respondent respectfully refers the Court to Wylie’s Irish Conveyancing Law (3rd Edition) page 615, para 17.24.
5.4Mr Justice Hart adopted the analysis of Judge McFarland as set out on Paragraph 12 of Judge McFarland’s judgement which we say is a proper analysis of the position. In any event this is a matter capable of rectification, as suggested by Judge McFarland, by the chain of title being clarified. This clarification requires the registration of Charles Ferris Senior as Fee Simple owner of the Folio by adverse possession following his death. His wife Bridget then occupied the land until her death and the surviving children of Charles and Bridget came to an agreement on the division of the lands which has been found to be a valid and enforceable agreement (i.e. the June 1989 agreement).
6.0 Question 3
Was Charles Ferris as the eldest son of Charles Ferris Snr. entitled by operation of Law to the lands upon the death intestate of his father on 15th November 1945?
6.1 Answer:
Yes Charles Ferris would have entitlement to the lands to which his father Charles Ferris (Snr.) was entitled at the date of death, subject to any entitlement of his mother. No steps were taken to register, formalise or any way deal with such entitlement and members of the family continued to occupy and use the said lands. There was some dispute as to what happened to the land after Charles Ferris Snr’s death. See paragraph (4) of Judge McFarland’s judgement and paragraph (7) of High Court judgement. Those who continued in occupation and possession of the lands had a potential claim by way of adverse possession. This is what prompted the Section 53 application in 1986 and the County Court hearing in 1989. These competing claims were then dealt with by the agreement of June 1989, which the court has found binding upon Charles Ferris.
25th February 2009
Dermot Fee QC
Gary McHugh BL
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
NAME OF PROCEEDINGS: Christine Meyler as an executor of the estate of Joseph Patrick Ferris (Deceased) v. Joseph Ferris
PARTY PROVIDING THE LIST: The Plaintiff/ Respondent
NAME OF COUNSEL: Dermot Fee QC
Gary McHugh BL
CASES
1.* Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 (Page 1064, Paragraphs D-E)
TEXT BOOKS
1.* Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2009 (Page 384)
2.*Strouds Judical Dictionary (6th Edition) Vol. 1 (Page 998)
3.Wylies Irish Conveyancing Law, 3rd Edition.
STATUTES
1.Limitation (Northern Ireland) Order 1989.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Date Event
March 1901 Registration of subject lands in the name of Anne Ferris
1908 Partial Transfer of some of the Lands
4th September 1925 Anne Ferris dies an intestate Widow
25th November 1945 Death of Charles Ferris Snr.
6th April 1962 Death of Bridget Ferris, wife of Charles Ferris Snr.
12th December 1985 Letters of Administration granted to Bridget Ferris and Joseph P. Ferris.
May 1986 Bridget Ferris and Joseph P. Ferris make joint application to the Land Registry to be registered as joint registered owners of the Folio. Charles Ferris objects.
30th May 1989 Contested registration application considered before Omagh County Court and application of Bridget Ferris and Joseph P. Ferris dismissed.
June 1989 Agreement reached in relation to the division of the lands.
18th May 1994 Bridget Ferris and Joseph Ferris swear oath to extract a Grant of Letters of Administration (Intestate) in the estate of Anne Ferris.
31st May 1994 Assent created where Bridget Ferris and Joseph P. Ferris as Personal Representatives of Anne Ferris assent to the vesting in Bridget Ferris (as to7/9th share) and Charles Ferris (as to a 2/9th share) on the Land comprised in Folio 2974 County Tyrone.
15th December 1994 Bridget Ferris transferred by way of gift her 7/9th share to Joseph P. Ferris
16th September 1997 Charles Ferris transferred by way of gift his 2.9th share to Joseph Ferris.
15th May 2000 Joseph P. Ferris dies and Christine Meyler is appointed by his last will as his executor. Under this will he bequeaths his 7/9th share to his six children in equal shares.
7th June 2005 Equity Civil Bill (Partition Proceedings) issued.
7th October 2005 Notice of intention to Defend.
8th November 2005 Notice for Further and Better Particulars.
22nd November 2005 Defendant’s “Defence” and Counterclaim.
9th January 2006 Statement of Evidence on Behalf of the Defendant
23rd February 2006 Replies to Particulars
19th May 2006 Statement of Evidence on behalf of the Plaintiff
19th February 2007 County Court Hearing
30th March 2007 Judgement of His Honour Judge McFarland
23rd April 2007 Notice of Appeal
September/ October 2007 County Court Appeal Hearing
8th April 2008 Judgement of Mr. Justice Hart
17th September 2008 Case Stated by Mr Justice Hart
2nd March 2009 Court of Appeal Hearing.
LIST OF KEY PERSONS
Name Role
Anne Ferris Lands first registered in her name
Charles Ferris Snr. One of Anne Ferris’s 8 children
Bridget Ferris One of Charles Ferris Senior’s daughters
Joseph P. Ferris One of Charles Ferris Senior’s sons
Charles Ferris One of Chares Ferris Senior’s sons and father of the Defendant
Christine Meyler Plaintiff and Solicitor
Joseph Ferris Defendant/ Appellant
James Montague Charles Ferris’s former Solicitor
(Word Count 1,921) J.F. Friday 27th February 2009.
PS. Is it not unreal that both of these Barristers are stating that swearing an Oath that Anne Ferris deceased 1925 had no Grandchildren, when she had 33 Grandchildren is not fraudulent?
Could this be compared with Solicitor Michael Lynne, who provided 'False Undertakings' and robbed the Irish Banks of over 80 million Euro and this was not criminal?
Is this not more proof of 'Serial Liars' and that in the eyes of the legal cloaks and wigs, Irish Solicitors do not commit crimes?
On Monday 2nd March 2009 at Court of Appeal in Belfast. Will we have to listen to more BBB?
BBB stands for Bullshit-Baffles-Brains. J.F.
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Bullet Points for Court of Appeal Monday 2nd March 2009. Joe Ferris, Appellant & Litigant in Person. 05/022648/A01
Question One? Non-Agreement of 20th June 1989.
1.How can the incredible ‘super-sonic’ time factors be explained?
2.How can solicitor James Montague explain the sequence of ‘time-travel’ that enables James Montague to write a letter dated 22nd June 1989 to Christine Meyler, stating ‘Dear Madam, we return herewith documents which you sent to us which include the Agreement which has been executed by our client. These are sent on the undertaking that the Notice of Appeal already served will be withdrawn. Yours faithfully, James Montague’?
3.Can solicitor James Montague explain how the letter written by him on Wednesday 21st June 1989, then posted in Omagh Town Post-Office, can be sorted and delivered to my late father Charles Ferris in a mountainous rural area, in order for my late father to receive this letter, then make an appointment with solicitor James Montague and arrange/attend this appointment jointly with myself as purported on Thursday 22nd June 1989?
4.How can solicitor James Montague explain this impossible ‘time-frame’?
5.Can solicitor James Montague explain how the purported agreement could be implemented at Land Registry, for the registration of Folio 2974, whilst at the same time my late father’s ‘written objection’ was still ‘lodged’ at Land Registry against any dealings with Folio 2974?
6.Can Solicitor James Montague explain the reasons for leaving this ‘written objection’ lodged at Land Registry?
7.Did solicitor Christine Meyler request an ‘undertaking’ that the ‘written objection’ lodged at Land registry would be withdrawn?
8.How can solicitor James Montague and solicitor Christine Meyler explain the ‘supersonic’ speed of getting the ‘purported agreement’ signed in June 1989, with the ‘non-implementation’ of those ‘purported agreement’ by registration of the property, i.e. Folio 2974 at Land Registry?
Question Two?
9.Why did solicitor Christine Meyler embark on the ‘contortion’ of going back to 1925 to administer the estate of Anne Ferris in 1994, (Folio 2974) when her clients had already administered the estate of their father Charles Ferris deceased November 1945 and (Folio 2974) in 1985?
10.How can solicitor Christine Meyler administer the estate(in 1994) of Anne Ferris deceased 1925 as now containing the property, i.e. Folio 2974 when her clients administered the estate (in 1985) of Charles Ferris deceased 1945 as containing the property, i.e. Folio 2974?
11.How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the false information in the oath document, namely that Anne Ferris had 33 Grandchildren and not as stated in the oath, ‘without grandchild, or other descendant, the issue of a predeceased child, her surviving’?
12.Can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the relationship of Joseph Ferris & Bridget Ferris to Anne Ferris deceased 1925?
13.How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the fact that Joseph Ferris & Bridget Ferris who signed the ‘false oath’ were actually denying that they were grandchildren of Anne Ferris?
14.It is asserted that ‘to demonstrate “fraud”, he must prove, to a very high standard, that the conduct of Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris in the oaths sworn by them amounted to dishonesty’ . How can solicitor Christine Meyler be ‘complicit’ in that as the solicitor on record from 1988, said Christine Meyler, was the solicitor representing, Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris, in so doing was ‘an officer of the court’ with respect to the facts of the 1985 administration, in which Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris, were the ‘legal representatives’ as the lawful children of Charles Ferris Snr (son of Anne Ferris deceased 1925) and logically therefore ‘grandchildren’ of Anne Ferris deceased 1925. In the ‘fraudulent oath’ in 1994, Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris provide ‘false information’ namely, that Anne Ferris, deceased 1925, ‘without grandchild, or other descendant, the issue of a predeceased child, her surviving’?
15.Fraud, ‘a false representation by means of a statement or conduct made knowingly or recklessly in order to gain a material advantage’ (page 232 Oxford Dictionary of Law). How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the purpose of the ‘false information’ in the ‘fraudulent oath’ sworn by Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris in 1994?
16.How can solicitor Christine Meyler disregard her responsibilities as an officer of the court as specified? : ‘It is impossible for the office to verify the content of each application. Indeed the office is entirely dependant on the solicitors lodging the application to ensure the factuality of the content of the application. The oath document which contains all the relevant detail in relation to entitlement to the grant is a sworn document and as such will be taken by the office as a statement of fact (provided it is completed properly). (Stephen Watson 2nd January 2007)
17.How can solicitor Christine Meyler be complicit in facilitating Bridget Ferris and Joseph P Ferris ‘to gain a material advantage’ as due to ‘incorrectly attested oath on the foot thereof an illegal assent was presented to Land Registry’ (in 1994) for the registration of Folio 2974, in subvention of the ‘written objection’ lodged by my late father Charles Ferris (in 1986) and which had been validated by Omagh County Court on 30th May 1989?
18.What actions has solicitor Christine Meyler taken, to ‘rectify’ the ‘false information’ provided for the administration, in the estate of Anne Ferris deceased 1925 as this ‘false instrument’ is now in the Public Records Office and persons undertaking ‘genealogy’ will be misled, due to the false information?
19.How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the rationale for ‘abandoning’ the legal process in which all the property, i.e. Folio 2974 devolved to Charles Ferris (deceased 1945) one of the sons of Anne Ferris (deceased 1925) and ‘switching’ to a legal process in which the 8 children of Anne Ferris (all of whom had issue) would have an entitlement to the property, i.e. Folio 2974?
20.How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the ‘abandoning’ of a ‘full entitlement’ to the property, i.e. Folio 2974 and ‘relegating’ to an ‘entitlement’ to part of a one eighth share?
21.How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain as to why the ‘false oath’ and ‘invalid assent’ were required in 1994 and a distinctly different application to Land Registry from the Section 53 application in 1986/1989?
22.What was ‘deficient’ with respect to the purported agreement of June 1989 that it could not be implemented on its own merits?
23.How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the ‘exclusion’ of my late father (in 1994) to implement the purported agreement of June 1989?
24.How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the ‘Forceful Eviction’ of my wife Attracta, my daughter Roisin and myself from the property, i.e. Folio 2974 on 30th June 2000, (by my late uncle’s family on the instruction of their solicitor Christine), if this seven ninths and two ninths agreement and ownership of the property, i.e. Folio 2974 was legal and binding?
25.How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the fact that she was also ‘advocating’ the ‘thuggery’ of my late uncle’s family in the ‘forceful eviction’ of my wife Attracta, my daughter Roisin and myself from the property, i.e. Folio 2974 on 30th June 2000, (by my late uncle’s family on the instruction of their solicitor Christine), if this seven ninths and two ninths agreement and ownership of the property, i.e. Folio 2974 was legal and binding?
26.How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the fact that my late father only became aware of his ‘purported ownership’ after I wrote to Mr. Walker at Land Registry in December 1994?
27.How can solicitor Christine Meyler explain the fact that she sent ‘a threatening letter’ to Brian Ferris (son of Charles Ferris the purported two ninths legal owner of Folio 2974) on 7th June 1996 and also reported (as a criminal matter) that Brian Ferris was grazing his herd of cattle on this land to the RUC, if this seven ninths and two ninths agreement and ownership of the property, i.e. Folio 2974 was legal and binding?
Question 3
28.Was Charles Ferris as the eldest son of Charles Ferris Snr. entitled by operation of Law to the lands upon the death intestate of his father on 15th November 1945?
29.Yes Charles Ferris would have entitlement to the lands to which his father Charles Ferris (Snr.) was entitled at the date of death, subject to any entitlement of his mother. No steps were taken to register, formalise or any way deal with such entitlement and members of the family continued to occupy and use the said lands. There was some dispute as to what happened to the land after Charles Ferris Snr’s death. See paragraph (4) of Judge McFarland’s judgement and paragraph (7) of High Court judgement. Those who continued in occupation and possession of the lands had a potential claim by way of adverse possession. This is what prompted the Section 53 application in 1986 and the County Court hearing in 1989. These competing claims were then dealt with by the agreement of June 1989, which the court has found binding upon Charles Ferris.
30.How can the sworn evidence of solicitor Christine Meyler and solicitor James Montague be accepted as ‘truth’ when both solicitors have previously provided evidence under oath, ‘that my late father had no legal entitlement by way of inheritance and only established an entitlement under the intestacies of his sister Mary (deceased 1975) and his sister Ellen (deceased 1982) and this was the only basis of his entitlement to a two ninths share’ in the property, namely Folio 2974?
31.How can the sworn evidence of solicitor Christine Meyler and solicitor James Montague be accepted or relied upon by the Court of Appeal, when both solicitors ‘misled and misrepresented the legal facts’ given as stated by Dermot Fee QC and Gary McHugh BL, that my late father was entitled to the ‘Fee Simple’ estate as the eldest son of ‘Charles Ferris Senior as Fee Simple owner of the Folio by adverse possession following his death’ deceased 15th November 1945?
32.How can the Court of Appeal condone, the blatant abuse of process and misuse of the valuable time and energy of the court system, (from 1986 to 2009) by solicitor Christine Meyler and solicitor James Montague, in the harassment of my late father and myself (and my six brothers and five sisters) and in so doing ‘denied’ my late father and his lawful children our rightful inheritance and ‘peaceful enjoyment of our private property’ as defined in the European Court of Human Rights?
CC. www.crookedlawyers.com www.rateyoursolicitor.com
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Clarification requested on aspects of Court of appeal Monday 2nd March 2009. Joe Ferris Appellant & Litigant in Person. 05/022648/A01
My witnesses, inclusive of members of the Victims of the Legal Profession Society (VLPS), who were present during the above hearing, namely Daniel Gallagher, Elva Gallagher, Tommy McManus, Helen McCusker, Edmund Fox, Eugene Owens and Charles Ferris, have outlined a number of points as VLPS and ‘Legal Experts by Experience’ that require clarification as follows:-
1.How can there be a ‘proper hearing’ of the ‘Court of Appeal’ when the Plaintiff solicitor Christine Meyler, was not present for the hearing?
2.How can the ‘abrupt’ ending to the hearing be explained, with only limited reference to the 32 ‘bullet point’ questions that were presented in evidence by me as a ‘Litigant in Person’ to the Court of Appeal?
3.Why was there a need for any agreement in 1989, when the law of the land at the time in 1945 clearly stated that my late father Charles Ferris was the full owner of the property in Folio 2974 on the death of his father on 15th November 1945?
4.How can the ‘Court of Appeal’ condone that my late father Charles Ferris, as the ‘rightful owner of Folio 2974’ was ‘conned’ by solicitor James Montague and solicitor Christine Meyler, both ‘officers of the court’ from 1986 to the date of my late father’s death 9th October 2005?
5.Where did the need ever arise that my late father as the ‘full owner’ should sign away seven ninths of his property?
6.Why would you have to fix something, if you already are the full owner?
7.Where did the need ever arise for my father to sign away seven ninths of his property?
8.How can the ‘Court of Appeal’ condone the behaviour of Mr. Dermot Fee QC and Barrister, Mr. Gary McHugh, who both concealed the legal fact ‘that my late father Charles Ferris as the eldest son was entitled to the property in Folio 2974, on the death of his father on 15th November 1945’ from both Judge David McFarland at Dungannon County Court in February 2007 and Justice Anthony Hart at the High Court in Belfast October 2007?
9.My late father was devastated when he received a diagnosis of having cancer in 1997, he could see no possibility of getting any justice in his lifetime and could see no alternative but to transfer the two ninths to my name, in the hope that I one day would get to the bottom of the corruption. How can the ‘Court of Appeal’ further compound the ‘injustice’ by ignoring the ‘law of the land’ that from 1945, my late father was the rightful owner of all the property in Folio 2974?
10.How can the ‘Court of Appeal’ accept the false evidence, that the purported agreement, was the result of negotiations between Bridget Ferris, Joseph P. Ferris and my late father Charles Ferris, when solicitor James Montague sent a letter, retyped verbatim:- ‘James McNulty & Co. Solicitors, 25 – 27 George’s Street, Omagh, Co. Tyrone, BT78 1DS Your Ref: CM?GG?5615 Our Ref: JM/AMCE/CCS.53 16th June 1989 Re: Application of Bridget & Joseph P. Ferris Folio Number: 2974 County Tyrone. Dear Sirs, We acknowledge yours of 15th inst with Notice of Appeal attached. Obviously no agreement or consent can be forthcoming until the Appeal is disposed of. Yours faithfully, James Montague. Messrs. R. H. O’Connor & Co., Solicitors, Omagh.?
11.How can the ‘Court of Appeal’ accept the evidence of solicitor James Montague as being the ‘truth’ when solicitor James Montague concealed the details of this Appeal from my late father? I only became aware of this letter from communication from solicitor Christine Meyler dated 23.02.2007 Ref: CM/MM/2275 Dear Mr. Ferris, Re: Partition Proceedings – Joseph Ferris Deceased Please find enclosed as directed by the Judge copy of my attendance note dated 25th May 1994 together with copy letters from McNulty & Co dated 16th June 1989 and 22nd June 1989. Yours faithfully, Christine Meyler.
12.How can the Court of Appeal ignore the point of law that is confirmed at paragraph 6.0 Question 3 Was Charles Ferris as the eldest son of Charles Ferris Snr. Entitled by operation of Law to the lands upon the death intestate of his father on 15th November 1945? Answer Yes. 25th February 2009 Dermot Fee QC Gary McHugh BL?
CC. www.crookedlawyers.com www.rateyoursolicitor.com
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News Letter 3rd March 2009 page 7 Ulster lawyers’ legal aid fees are ‘double England and Wales’ By David Young newsdesk@newsletter.co.uk
LEGAL aid payments to lawyers on criminal cases in Northern Ireland are more than double that paid in England and Wales, it was revealed yesterday.
Taxpayers shell out an average of £13,800 to solicitors and barristers working on each criminal case held in the region compared to £6,300 invoiced by legal representatives in other parts of the UK, according to the Northern Ireland Court Service.
Spiralling legal aid costs, which are currently sitting at £80 million per year, have left the Court Service staring at a £60 million funding deficit over the next two years, its director told a Stormont committee.
David Lavery said average lawyer’s bills for many civil cases were comparably higher than elsewhere in the UK.
On top of the legal aid funding black hole, he said the service needed an additional £100 million to replace court buildings across the region that are no longer fit for purpose.
He said he and his officials, who are allocated £65 million per annum for the legal aid payments, faced an annual wrangle with Treasury officials in London in order to get the extra money to make up the difference.
“That’s no way to run a business,” he told members of the Assembly and Executive Review committee.
“To start the year knowing we don’t have enough money and waiting until the fourth quarter until it’s resolved.”
Mr Lavery, who was briefing the committee as part of its on-going investigation into the costs of devolving justice powers from Westminster to Stormont, said the number of barristers in the region had doubled from 276 to around 560 in the last 20 years.
Last year 70,000 people were granted legal aid in Northern Ireland.
He said while reforms were being implemented to try and bring down the total cost, he conceded more radical measures may need to be considered.
In particular he said the tradition of employing two barristers – one junior and one senior – on the majority of criminal cases may have to be looked at.
“One of the cost drivers in Northern Ireland is the amount of legal representation in cases,” he said.
“In criminal cases there are senior and junior counsels and a solicitor. In England and Wales many more cases are adequately dealt with, with one solicitor and one counsel rather than a solicitor and two barristers.”
Mr Lavery said while the figures of £13,800 and £6,300 for average criminal case costs may not be fully comparable given slightly different ways of calculating bills, there was no double the rate in Northern Ireland was significantly higher than England and Wales.
He said he hoped devolving justice powers to a local administration would help improve the funding process.
The committee also heard from representatives of the Legal Services Commission, which distributes the payments to lawyers.
Chair Jim Daniel said despite the end to the Troubles there had been a dramatic rise in the number of complex criminal cases going through the courts in Northern Ireland.
PS. Is this more evidence that crime pays very well, but only if you are a solicitor or barrister in Northern Ireland? J.F.
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The Sunday Times 8th March 2009 page 22
American Judges took bribes to jail teenagers Tony Alllen-Mills New York
LIKE many other 15-year old schoolgirls, Hilary Transue was not quite as respectful as she might have been towards teachers at her Pennsylvania school. Yet she was a clever computer-savvy pupil who had good grades and had never been in serious trouble.
One day, for a joke, she published a spoof article on the MySpace social networking website, mocking the assistant principal at her high school in Wilkes-Barre. The teacher complained and, to the astonishment of her family, Transue was charged with harassment and hauled into juvenile court.
That was where the family’s surprise turned to horror. After studying the case for two minutes, Judge Mark Ciavarella sentenced Transue to three months in juvenile detention. She was led out in handcuffs.
Two years later it is Ciavarella’s turn to go to jail and Transue is among several hundred former inmates of local juvenile detention centres who are suing for compensation after America’s most sinister judicial scandals of recent times.
The extraordinary case of the Pennsylvania judges who were paid bribes by private prison operators for every child they sent to jail has astounded America and shamed its judiciary, just as the US Supreme Court is considering another possible landmark case involving alleged judicial corruption.
Ciavarella and Michael Conahan, a fellow judge from Luzerne county in north – eastern Pennsylvania, pleaded guilty last month to pocketing more that $2.6m (E2m) in kickbacks from the operators of two privately run juvenile detention centres.
Both men face more than seven years in jail for their roles in a bizarre kids-for-cash scheme that flourished despite local newspaper investigations and complaints by families that their children were being denied access to lawyers.
Prosecutors alleged that Conaghan secured lucrative contracts for private jails which were paid by the state according to the numbers of inmates they housed. Ciavarella ensured that the jails were filled with juvenile offenders.
Lawyers for the detention centres involved have claimed that the scheme was concocted by the judges who forced the owners to pay up or possible lose their contracts.
Between 2002 and 2006 Ciavarella is thought to have jailed a quarter of the defendants who appeared in his court, compared with an average of other judges of one in 10. In many cases he persuaded the parents to waive their rights to legal representation on the grounds that the process would be cheaper and quicker.
Among the judge’s victims was Jamie Quinn, a 14-year-old girl who got into a fight with a friend and ended up slapping her. Her punishment: nine months in juvenile detention.
Chad Uca was 15 when he pushed a boy at school, causing him to cut his head on a locker. Uca got three months.
Another child was jailed for shoplifting a $4 jar of nutmeg. All were first-time offenders.
Publicity over Transue’s case helped to spur a federal investigation and the judges were charged with conspiracy and tax fraud. Ciavarella, 58. acknowledged that he had “disgraced my judgeship”.
The case has come at an awkward moment for the Supreme Court, which heard legal arguments last week concerning a West Virginia judge who stood for election with money provided by a local coal baron, then promptly ruled in the businessman’s favour in a multi-million-dollar dispute.
PS. A very interesting article found by J.J. O’Sullivan Dublin VLPS.
Would we have any corrupt judges in Holy Ireland? J.F.
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A man who has served 27 years for the murder of a young woman has had his conviction quashed by the Court of Appeal.
Sean Hodgson, now 57, was sentenced to life for the 1979 killing of 22-year-old gas board clerk and part-time barmaid Teresa De Simone, who was found strangled in Southampton.
But the 1982 conviction was ruled "unsafe" by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, sitting with Mr Justice Irwin and Mr Justice Wyn Williams.
Emerging from the Royal Courts of Justice in London a free man, Mr Hodgson waved from the steps at a large crowd of waiting journalists.
Asked how he felt, he said simply: "Ecstatic."
His brother Peter added: "On behalf of my brother, I would like to thank the solicitor a million million times."
He added: "I've had a dream for 27 years. I know it's a hell of a long time. But it's finally come true."
After recounting the facts in detail of what he described as a "dismal story", Lord Judge said:
"This decision leaves some important unanswered questions.
"Perhaps the most important is that we do not know who raped and killed the dead girl.
"We can but hope that, for the sake of the appellant and the family of the murdered girl, that her killer may yet be identified and brought to justice."
The case was referred to the Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), an independent body which investigates possible miscarriages of justice.
At the time of his trial, DNA tests were not available, with the world's first use of such evidence in court not taking place until 1986 in Leicester.
But in November last year, following requests from Mr Hodgson's legal representatives, Hampshire Police and the Forensic Science Service undertook a comprehensive forensic case review and examination of material, including DNA testing on samples collected at the time of the murder.
In the light of new evidence, the CCRC decided to refer Mr Hodgson's case to the Court of Appeal because it considered that there was a "real possibility that the court would consider the conviction unsafe and quash it".
Mr Hodgson becomes one of the longest-serving victims of a miscarriage of justice.
The only comparable case is that of Stephen Downing, who spent 27 years in jail for the murder of typist Wendy Sewell in Bakewell, Derbyshire. His conviction was overturned in 2002.
PS. Another incredible miscarriage of justice. How can the ‘Lawyers’ for the prosecution explain away the incarceration for 27 years of an innocent and vulnerable man? J.F.
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Neutral Citation No.: [2009] NICC 10 Ref: HAR7369
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down Delivered: 13/2/2009
(subject to editorial corrections)*
IN THE CROWN COURT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
________
DOWNPATRICK CROWN COURT
(SITTING AT BELFAST)
________
THE QUEEN
-v-
GEORGE IGNATIUS MARTIN and MARY MARTIN
________
HART J
[1] The defendants are husband and wife and have pleaded guilty to four counts under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, one of forgery contrary to s. 1, and one of using a forged instrument contrary to s. 3, both in respect of a document dated 17 December 1997; and two further similar counts in respect of a document dated 25 January 2000.
[2] The circumstances giving rise to these charges are that Annie Martin, who is a widow aged 93, and her son the first defendant George Ignatius Martin lived in the family house at 54 Downpatrick Street, Saintfield for many years. This was originally a Housing Executive property and was purchased after Annie Martin’s husband died in 1986. She was the tenant and it was purchased in the joint names of herself and the first defendant with a mortgage from a building society.
[3] In 1992 George Ignatius Martin married Mary Martin and after their marriage they and their children lived in 54 Downpatrick Street, sharing their home with Annie Martin.
[4] The charges to which George and Mary Martin have pleaded guilty relate to the forgery of signatures upon two documents which were prepared to carry out a transfer of Annie Martin’s share in 54 Downpatrick Street to Mary Martin.
[5] This was carried out in two stages, the first being that a Land Registry Transfer dated 17 December 1997 was drawn up which had the effect of joining Mary Martin as a joint owner of the property with her husband and Annie Martin. This is the subject of counts one and two. The second stage was that on 25 January 2000 a further Land Registry Transfer was drawn up which had the effect of making George and Mary Martin the sole owners of 54 Downpatrick Street, thereby depriving Annie Martin of her remaining interest in that property. This gives rise to counts four and five.
[6] By their pleas the defendants have admitted that they forged the signature of Annie Martin to these documents. This came to light after Annie Martin was admitted to hospital in April 2006. In his statement of additional evidence another son, Malachy, describes how his wife called and found her mother in law very ill, and as a result she was admitted to hospital, although the exact date does not appear in the committal papers. Malachy Martin described in his statement that sometime in mid May 2006 after a nurse said to him and George Ignatius Martin that their mother was well enough to be discharged the first defendant shortly afterwards said that she ‘won’t be coming back to Saintfield, she will have to go into a nursing home’. When asked why, the first defendant allegedly said that ‘she was becoming too much bother’, and that they owned all of the house now. Later that night Malachy Martin says that he rang his brother and asked him what was happening, and was told ‘look Malachy, she’s not getting back in, she’s too old, she’s had her day and she’s now too much trouble and we don’t have enough room in the house’. When the second defendant came onto the phone she said much the same.
[7] Following the refusal of the defendants to allow Annie Martin to return to 54 Downpatrick Street she had to remain in hospital for several weeks whilst alternative accommodation was found for her, and eventually a place was found in a nursing home in Belfast, where she continues to reside, and her son Malachy contributes towards the cost.
[8] Malachy Martin was unaware that his mother no longer had any share in the house, and after some enquiries the matter was reported to the police and as the result of complaints made by Annie Martin was investigated. It was discovered that her signature had been forged to the documents to which I have referred. In her police statement Annie Martin maintains that she never agreed to any such transaction.
[9] The present defendants were originally jointly charged with Ann Ervine, the solicitor who prepared the transfers, but the prosecution did not proceed with the charges against Ann Ervine at the trial and the charges against her were ordered to lie on the file. Mr Charles McKay QC (who appears on behalf of the prosecution with Mr David Russell) accepts that evidence produced to the prosecution by Ann Ervine on the morning of the trial indicated that there were numerous occasions upon which she contacted Annie Martin in respect of instructions from Annie Martin to transfer her interest in the property to Mary Martin. This evidence took the form of a book recording phone contact with her, and the entries suggested that Annie Martin, contrary to what she later alleged to the police, was aware at that time that the procedures to transfer her interest in the house were taking place. Mr McKay QC said that as this book was only produced on the morning of the trial the prosecution were not able to have it forensically examined, but the entries supported Ann Ervine’s account and on visual examination of the entries there was nothing to cast doubt on their authenticity. When asked by the court he accepted that there was possibly an argument that there had in fact been agreement by Annie Martin to her interest being transferred, and that the arrangement was then improperly carried out, and I propose to sentence the defendants upon this basis. Had this not been the case, the sentence would have been greater.
[10] It may be that part of the impetus for the defendants behaviour was due to a concern by the defendants that if Annie Martin was no longer able to live in her own home due to ill health and advancing years, and had to be admitted to a nursing home, the cost of nursing home fees might be recouped from her interest in the property, and this might require their home to be sold. In the pre-sentence report on George Ignatius Martin it is recorded that he acted to prevent losing his home; but the report on Mary Martin says that she asserted that “she wanted this to happen so that the house would be secure for her family in the event of her husband’s death”, a somewhat different motive.
[11] However, Mr McKay QC drew attention to evidence which shows that the defendants’ action in not allowing Annie Martin to return home when she was fit to leave the hospital was due to financial motives. Mortgage records in the committal papers reveal that a mortgage of £36,400 was taken out on the property in February 2003, which was of course after the second forgeries resulted in Annie Martin’s interest being extinguished. It seems that some or all of this may have been to pay for home improvements and an extension from which Annie Martin may have received some benefit like the other occupants of the house. However, in June 2006 the property was re-mortgaged and a further advance of £44,450 was paid to the defendants on 28 June 2006, of which £18,852 was immediately transferred elsewhere. This still left a balance of £24,854.60 which had been reduced to £11,587.45 by 8 August, see p. 157. When I asked Mr Weir QC (who appears for Mary Martin with Mr Bacon) where the money had gone he replied that there were credit card debts of approximately £15,000 and some furniture and beds were bought for the children, and money was also spent on decoration and wooden floors.
[12] Whilst there may be some evidence to suggest that at some time Annie Martin was a willing party to a change in the ownership of the property, the defendants have pleaded guilty to forging her signatures. Not only that, but the re-mortgaging of the house and obtaining such a substantial additional advance so soon after refusing to allow her to return to what had been her home for so many years is not only unedifying as Mr Weir QC accepted, but suggests that their motive throughout was greed and that they were determined to achieve improperly what might otherwise happen voluntarily, or by operation of law because, as defence counsel pointed out, as joint owner George Ignatius Martin would succeed to his mother’s interest on her death.
[13] The actions of Mary Martin in holding her mother in law’s hand in an attempt to help her to sign, and then ultimately signing in her mother in law’s name, suggest that even if the initiative for this came from her husband, she played as active a part, and may well have been the moving spirit.
[14] There are a number of mitigating factors. First of all, both defendants are entitled to credit for their pleas of guilty, albeit that that credit must be reduced because the pleas of guilty were not entered until the morning of the trial, thereby requiring Annie Martin to contemplate having to be brought to court. Secondly, as already stated, there is material available to the prosecution which suggests that Annie Martin did give instructions at some stage that her interest in 54 Downpatrick Street be transferred to the defendant Mary Martin. Thirdly, both defendants were persons of not merely good, but irreproachable, previous character as may be seen from the various testimonials handed into court on their behalf.
[15] Mr Ramsay QC on behalf of George Ignatius Martin, submitted that his client had otherwise been a dutiful and supportive son to his mother despite her failing health, and his instructions were that the initiative did come from her. As did Mr Weir QC he referred to the effect a custodial sentence would have on their young children, and he confirmed that his client will not oppose the rectification proceedings that have been launched.
[16] Mr Weir QC for Mary Martin said that his client was motivated by a misguided desire to achieve more security, but this does not sit well with the substantial amount involved in the re-mortgage in June 2006 after the defendants refused to allow Annie Martin to return home.
[17] Finally, there is the fact that if either or both of the defendants goes to prison this will have an effect upon the children of the family, both of whom are at primary school. Medical evidence in relation to the younger child confirms that he has mild autism, although he remains in mainstream education. I accept that any disturbance in his routine would be detrimental to him. The other is due to leave primary education this year. Both Mr Ramsay QC and Mr Weir QC urged me to treat this as an exceptional factor and to show mercy to the children by not sending their parents to prison, pointing to the burden that would fall on their elderly maternal grandparents who would have to assume sole responsibility for them. They currently look after the children after school until they can be collected.
[18] Forgery of documents is always a very serious matter. As Ognall J pointed out in R v. Lincoln (1994) 15 Cr. App. R. (S.) 333 –
“However exceptional the circumstances forgery – particularly forgery of documents of this character, affecting title to property, must in our view, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, be visited by a sentence of immediate custody.”
In that case the court reduced a sentence of imprisonment from twelve months’ to six months. Lincoln has since been referred to with approval by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v. Kidd and Bianchy [2008] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) where sentences of twelve months’ imprisonment on pleas of guilty were upheld. Mr Weir QC argued that in the present case the title would not have been affected, but that is not a significant factor. The chief mischief in this case was to take Annie Martin’s home away from her in her declining years, and inflict upon her the deep distress at being excluded from her home and contact with her grandchildren that is clear from her victim impact statement. Even on the basis that Annie Martin may have agreed to, or even initiated, the suggestion that the property be put in the sole names of the defendants, I do not believe that she ever contemplated that they would exclude her from her home. The defendants forged her signatures to get this house into their names and took advantage of her absence in hospital to refuse to allow her back and then took advantage of their sole ownership to get a large amount of money. I do not regard the impact that their being imprisoned will have on their children as being an exceptional factor in those circumstances.
[19] I am satisfied that this is a case where immediate custodial sentences are required. I see no reason to distinguish between the defendants and I consider that the least sentence I can impose is one of six months’ imprisonment on each count, the sentences will run concurrently.
PS. This case was covered by the BBC Spotlight programme broadcast on Tuesday 17th March 2009 on BBC 1 and on Wednesday 18th March 2009 on BBC 2 presenter Stephen Walker.
The Spotlight programme explains how the expert evidence of Forensic Scientist Stephen Maxwell in deciphering the signature of Annie Martin as a forgery, was crucial evidence for Detective Constable Eadie to further interrogate the statements of Ignatius Martin and his wife Mary Martin, resulting in their later admissions of guilty to forgery.
One of the major facts in my late father’s case was the ‘false oath document' which was described by the Lord Chief Justice, Sir Brian Kerr, during my case before the ‘Court of Appeal’ Monday 2nd March 2009, as “A silly, stupid fraud, so silly and stupid a fraud that it could not be a fraud”.
Is false information in a legal document and forgery not one and that same crime, called fraud? J.F.
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Loan shark who raped debtor jailed
Yesterday, 01:10 pm
A loan shark who raped an impoverished customer and threatened to petrol-bomb another woman's house has been jailed for seven years.
Paul Nicholson, 39, squeezed hundreds of thousands of pounds from working-class families.
If repayments were overdue he demanded his money by threatening debtors with the baseball bat, machete and knuckle dusters he owned.
Warrington Crown Court has heard that Nicholson, who lived in a £1 million house next to a golf course in Delamere, Cheshire, forced one woman who owed him money to perform a sex act.
He told one debtor: "Your priority is to pay me, not feed your kids."
The former nightclub doorman was convicted last month of 18 charges which included rape, 12 counts of blackmail, lying about his criminal record, operating without a licence and assault.
His girlfriend, mother-of-one Tracey Rogers, 38, helped run his "wicked" empire from their home and she was convicted of blackmail, operating without a licence and acquiring criminal property.
The couple targeted more than 800 poor people across Widnes and Runcorn in Cheshire, charging up to 150 per cent interest on loans.
PS. Are there any cases in Ireland of ‘Loan Sharks’ being sent to jail for their exploitation and extortion? J.F.
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business contracts legal terms and definitions glossary
glossary of business contract terms - general, financial, property and latin definitions - a translation guide for legal gobbledegook and contract jargon
http://www.businessballs.com/realale.htm
Here is a business contracts terms and definitions glossary - essentially for UK, and a useful guide for anywhere else in the world. When you are involved in business contract negotiations - especially for your own business - you can achieve far better negotiated results if you have a good understanding of what contracts and their terminology actually mean.
This will empower you to utilise your legal advice for specialist legal issues rather than strategic decision-making, over which you must have full control.
If you are the boss, or accountable for a contractual outcome, you must understand contracts and their meaning. When you understand what contracts mean you increase your control over the situation, your advisors, the other party, their advisors, and the negotiated outcomes.
The provision of this material by Business Link is gratefully acknowledged. It is subject to Crown copyright. For further information visit the Business Link website.
Contracts are an important part of business life. They establish agreements between you and your employees, landlords or tenants, suppliers, customers and with other businesses. They are usually drawn up by solicitors and can be full of legal jargon.
A contract is an agreement that commits you or your business to a course of action.
Therefore, it is important that you ask your solicitor or adviser to explain any language or terminology that you do not understand.
This guide provides plain English explanations for some of the expressions that you might come across, including:
· general contracts terms
· financial contracts terms
· property contracts terms
· Latin contracts terms
You should never sign any contract unless you have read and understood what it aims to do and what the terminology means.
Note: terms highlighted in bold within the current definitions (eg offer) are explained elsewhere in this guide.
general business contracts terms and definitions glossary
Acceptance - the unconditional agreement to an offer. This creates the contract. Before acceptance, any offer can be withdrawn, but once accepted the contract is binding on both sides.
Any conditions have the effect of a counter offer that must be accepted by the other party.
Agent - somebody appointed to act on behalf of another person (known as the principal). The amount of authority to deal that the agent has is subject to agreement between the principal and the agent. However, unless told otherwise, third parties can assume the agent has full powers to deal.
Arbitration - using an independent third party to settle disputes without going to court. The third party acting as arbitrator must be agreed by both sides. Contracts often include arbitration clauses nominating an arbitrator in advance.
Breach of contract - failure by one party to a contract to uphold their part of the deal. A breach of contract will make the whole contract void and can lead to damages being awarded against the party which is in breach.
Collective agreement - term used for agreements made between employees and employers, usually involving trade unions. They often cover more than one organization. Although these can be seen as contracts, they are governed by employment law, not contract law.
Comfort letters - documents issued to back up an agreement but which do not have any contractual standing. They are often issued by a parent or associate company stating that the group will back up the position of a small company to improve its trading position. They always state that they are not intended to be legally binding. Also known as letters of comfort.
Company seal - an embossing press used to indicate the official signature of a company when accompanied by the signatures of two officers of the company. Since 1989 it has been possible for a company to indicate its agreement without use of the seal, by two signatures (directors or company secretary) plus a formal declaration. However, some companies still prefer to use a seal and the articles of a company can override the law and require a seal to be used.
Conditions - major terms in a contract. Conditions are the basis of any contract and if one of them fails or is broken, the contract is breached. These are in contrast to warranties, the other type of contract term, which are less important and will not usually lead to the breach of the contract - but rather an adjustment in price or a payment of damages.
Confidentiality agreement - an agreement made to protect confidential information if it has to be disclosed to another party. This often happens during negotiations for a larger contract, when the parties may need to divulge information about their operations to each other. In this situation, the confidentiality agreement forms a binding contract not to pass on that information whether or not the actual contract is ever signed. Also known as a non-disclosure agreement.
Consideration - in a contract each side must give some consideration to the other. Often referred to as the quid pro quo - see the Latin terms below. Usually this is the price paid by one side and the goods supplied by the other. But it can be anything of value to the other party, and can be negative - eg someone promising not to exercise a right of access over somebody else's land in return for a payment would be a valid contract, even if there was no intention of ever using the right anyway.
Consumer - a person who buys goods or services but not as part of their business. A company can be a consumer for contracts not related to its business - especially for goods or services it buys for its employees. Charities are also treated as consumers.
Due diligence - the formal process of investigating the background of a business, either prior to buying it, or as another party in a major contract. It is used to ensure that there are no hidden details that could affect the deal.
Employment contract - a contract between an employer and an employee. This differs from other contracts in that it is governed by employment legislation - which takes precedence over normal contract law.
Exclusion clauses - clauses in a contract that are intended to exclude one party from liability if a stated circumstance happens. They are types of exemption clauses. The courts tend to interpret them strictly and, where possible, in favour of the party that did not write them. In customer dealings, exclusion clauses are governed by regulations that render most of them ineffective but note that these regulations do not cover you in business dealings.
Exemption clauses - clauses in a contract that try to restrict the liability of the party that writes them. These are split into exclusion clauses that try to exclude liability completely for specified outcomes, and limitation clauses that try to set a maximum on the amount of damages the party may have to pay if there is a failure of some part of the contract. Exemption clauses are regulated very strictly in consumer dealings but these don't apply for those who deal in the course of their business.
Express terms - the terms actually stated in the contract. These can be the written terms, or verbal ones agreed before or at the time the contract is made (see implied terms).
Franchising - commercial agreements that allow one business to deal in a product or service controlled by another. For example, most car manufacturers give franchises to sell their cars to local garages, who then operate using the manufacturer's brand.
Going concern - accounting idea that a business should be valued on the basis that it will be continuing to trade and able to use its assets for their intended purpose. The alternative is a break-up basis, which sets values according to what the assets could be sold for immediately - often much less than their value if they were kept in use.
Implied terms - are terms and clauses that are implied in a contract by law or custom and practice without actually being mentioned by any party. Terms implied by custom and practice can always be overridden by express terms, but some terms implied by law cannot be overridden, particularly those relating to consumers (see exemption clauses).
Incorporate - inclusion in, or adoption of, some term or condition as part of the contract. It differs from its company law definition where it refers to the legal act of creating a company.
Injunction - a remedy sometimes awarded by the court that stops some action being taken. It can be used to stop another party doing something against the terms of the contract.
Injunctions are at the court's discretion and a judge may refuse to give one and award damages instead - see the finance contract terms below.
Joint and several liability - where parties act together in a contract as partners they have joint and several liability. In addition to all the partners being responsible together, each partner is also liable individually for the entire contract - so a creditor could recover a whole debt from any one of them individually, leaving that person to recover their shares from the rest of the partners.
Joint venture - an agreement between two or more independent businesses in a business enterprise, in which they will share the costs, management, profits or benefits arising from the venture. The exact shares and responsibilities will be set out in a Joint Venture Agreement.
Jurisdiction - a jurisdiction clause sets out the country or state whose laws will govern the contract and where any legal action must take place. Don't forget that England and Scotland have different legal codes, and this may need to be specified.
Letters of comfort - see Comfort letters.
Liability - a person or business deemed liable is subject to a legal obligation. A person/business who commits a wrong or breaks a contract or trust is said to be liable or responsible for it.
Limited liability - usually refers to limited companies where the owners' liability to pay the debts of the company is limited to the value of their shares. It can also apply to contracts where a valid limitation clause has been included in the terms.
Liquidation - the formal breaking up of a company or partnership by realising (selling or transferring to pay a debt) the assets of the business. This usually happens when the business is insolvent, but a solvent business can be liquidated if it no longer wishes to continue trading for whatever reason (see receivership in the financial terms below).
Misrepresentation - where one party to a contract makes a false statement of fact to the other which that other person relies on. Where there has been a misrepresentation then the party who received the false statement can get damages for their loss. The remedy of rescission (putting things back to how they were before the contract began) is sometimes available, but where it is not possible or too difficult the court can award damages instead.
Non-executive director - a director who does not work directly for a company but advises the other directors. Non-executive directors have the full powers and authority of any other director and can bind the company to any contract.
Offer - an offer to contract must be made with the intention to create, if accepted, a legal relationship. It must be capable of being accepted (not containing any impossible conditions), must also be complete (not requiring more information to define the offer) and not merely advertising.
Parent company - where one company owns more than 50 per cent of the voting rights of another company it is the parent of that company which in turn becomes its subsidiary. It can also occur where the parent has less than 50 per cent but can control the board of directors of the subsidiary: that is, it has the power to appoint and remove directors without referring to other shareholders.
Partnership - when two or more people or organizations join together to carry on a business.
Proxy - a person who acts on behalf of another for a specific purpose, or the form used to make such an appointment. In a company a shareholder can appoint a proxy to attend a meeting and vote on their behalf.
Quorum - the minimum number of people needed at a meeting for it to proceed and make any decisions.
Ratification - giving authority to an act that has already been done. A company general meeting resolution can ratify an act previously done by the directors; or a principal can choose to ratify the act of an agent that was beyond the specified power of the agent.
Registered Office - the official address of the company as stated on the register at Companies House. Any documents delivered to this address are considered to be legally served on the company.
Repudiation - has two meanings in contract law. The first is where a party refuses to comply with a contract and this amounts to a breach of contract. The second is where a contract was made by a minor (person under the age of 18) who then repudiates it at or shortly after the age of 18. Then the repudiation voids the contract rather than causing a breach of contract.
Restrictive covenant - is often included in long-term contracts and contracts of employment to stop the parties working with competitors during the period of the agreement and for some time thereafter. However, unless carefully written the courts will see them as being a restraint of trade and not enforce them.
Service contract - directors and officers of a company are usually given service contracts that are different to a contract of service or employment contract. This is because directors and officers are not always employees and the effect of employment law is different.
Shareholders' agreement - an agreement between all of the shareholders about how the company should be run and the application of the rights of the shareholders. This acts as a contract between the shareholders. The company itself is not bound by it, as it is not a party to the agreement.
Subject to contract - words used on documents exchanged by parties during contract negotiations. They denote that the document is not an offer or acceptance and negotiations are ongoing. Often the expression without prejudice is used when subject to contract is meant.
Trademark - a registered name or logo that is protected by law. Trademarks must be granted through the Patent Office.
Underwriter - a person who signs as party to a contract. Now usually only applied to insurance contracts where the underwriters are those who agree to bear all or part of the risk in return for the premium payments. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London are also known as names.
Unfair terms - some terms are made unfair by legislation and will not be enforced by the courts and may even be interpreted against the person who included them in the contract. The legislation mainly protects consumers, but can also apply where there is a business-to-business contract in which one party is significantly more powerful than the other.
Void - a void contract is one that cannot be performed or completed at all. A void contract is void from the beginning (ab initio - see the Latin terms below) and the normal remedy, if possible, is to put things back to where they were before the contract. Contracts are void where one party lacks the capacity to perform the contracted task, it is based on a mistake, or it is illegal.
Warranties - promises made in a contract, but which are less than a condition. Failure of a warranty results in liability to pay damages (see the financial terms below) but will not be a breach of contract unlike failure of a condition, which does breach the contract.
Without prejudice - a term used by solicitors in negotiations over disputes where an offer is made in an attempt to avoid going to court. If the case does go to court no offer or facts stated to be without prejudice can be disclosed as evidence. Often misused by businesses during negotiations when they actually mean subject to contract.
financial contracts terms and definitions glossary
Note: terms highlighted in bold within the current definitions (eg wound up) are explained elsewhere in this guide.
Bankruptcy - the formal recognition that a person cannot pay their debts as they are due. Note this only applies to individuals, companies and partnerships that become insolvent are wound up.
Damages - money paid as the normal remedy in the law as compensation for an individual or company's loss. If another type of remedy is wanted (such as an injunction - see general contract terms below) but cannot be or is not given by the court, then damages will be awarded instead.
Debenture - a formal debt agreement. It refers to both the agreement and the document that verifies it. It is usually issued by companies and is generally supported by security over some property of the debtor. If the debtor defaults, the creditor can take and sell the property. Debentures are often transferable, so the creditor can sell it and there are markets on formal stock exchanges that deal in types of debenture. It is sometimes referred to as debenture stock. A mortgage is a type of debenture but one that is always secured, usually against land.
Floating charge - a form of security for a debt. Instead of naming a specific property, which can be taken by the creditor if the debtor defaults (as in a fixed charge like a mortgage), a class of goods or assets is named, such as the debtor's stock. This allows the debtor to trade in the assets freely, but if the debtor fails to make repayments then the floating charge becomes a fixed charge (known as crystallisation) over all the stock at that time. The creditor can then take and sell it to recover the debt.
Guarantee - a secondary agreement by which one person promises to honour the debt of another if that debtor fails to pay. Banks and other creditors often call on directors of small companies to give their personal guarantees for company debts. A guarantee must be in writing. The guarantor can only be sued if the actual debtor can't pay, in contrast to indemnity.
Indemnity - a promise by a third party to pay a debt owed, or repay a loss caused, by another party. Unlike a guarantee, the person owed can get the money direct from the indemnifier without having to chase the debtor first. Insurance contracts are contracts of indemnity: the insurance company pays first, and then tries to recover the loss from whoever caused it.
Insolvency - the situation where a person or business cannot pay its debts as they fall due (see bankruptcy, liquidation and receivership).
Liquidation - the formal breaking up of a company or partnership by realising (selling or transferring to pay a debt) the assets of the business. This usually happens when the business is insolvent, but a solvent business can be liquidated if it no longer wishes to continue trading for whatever reason (see receivership).
Receivership - the appointment of a licensed insolvency practitioner to take over the running of a company. A creditor with a secured debt appoints the receiver. The job of the receiver is to recover the debt either by taking the security and selling it or by running the business as a going concern until the debt is paid off (see liquidation).
Redemption of shares - where a company issues shares on terms stating that they can be bought back by the company. Not all shares can be redeemed, only those stated to be redeemable when they were issued. The payment for the shares must generally come from reserves of profit so that the capital of the company is preserved.
Remedy/Remedies - payments or actions ordered by the court as settlement of a dispute. The most common is damages (a payment of money). Others include specific performance (of an action required in the contract), injunction (see the general contract terms above) and rescission - putting things back to how they were before the contract was signed.
Stamp duty - a tax on transactions. Only applied to specific types of transactions eg dealings in land and buildings, shares and ships.
Wound up - winding-up is the formal procedure for disbanding a company.
property contracts terms and definitions glossary
Note: terms highlighted in bold within the current definitions (eg deed) are explained elsewhere in this guide.
Break clause - a clause that allows a tenant to end a lease at specific times during the period of the lease.
Conveyance - a deed that conveys property rights.
Covenant - a promise within a contract for the performance or non-performance of a specified act.
Deed - a written document by which a person transfers ownership of real property to another. A deed must be properly executed and delivered in order to be effective.
Disclaimer - a written document denying legal responsibility, or a limitation of rights that might otherwise be claimed.
Easement - an interest in land owned by another that entitles its holder to a specific limited use or enjoyment eg the right to cross the land, or to continue to have an unobstructed view over it.
Encroachment - when a building or some portion of it, or a wall or fence, extends beyond the land of the owner and illegally intrudes upon that of an adjoining owner.
Equity - the monetary value of a property after any claims, such as a mortgage, are taken away.
Eviction - the dispossession of a tenant of leased property by force or through the legal process.
Exchange - the exchange of agreed, signed contracts. The transaction between the seller and the buyer is then legally binding, and completion (including the final transfer of money) usually takes place two to four weeks later.
Fixture - a permanently fixed piece of furniture or equipment incorporated into a property. Removing it would cause damage to buildings or land, and is therefore regarded as legally part of it.
Freehold - outright ownership of a property. This type of tenure contrasts with leasehold where the leaseholder has the rights to occupy a property for a specified period of time.
Habitable - suitable and fit for a person to live in and free of any faults that might endanger the health and safety of occupants.
Holdover Tenancy - a tenancy that arises when someone remains in possession of a property after the expiration of the previous tenancy and is recognised by the landlord by accepting rent.
Indenture - a deed or other document to which two or more parties are bound.
Invitee - a person, such as a customer, who is present in a place either by the express or the implied invitation of the occupier. This normally means that the occupier has to exercise reasonable care to protect the safety of the invited person.
Landlord - the owner of property that is leased or rented to others.
Lease - a contract by which an owner of property conveys exclusive possession and use of it for a specified rent and for a specified period - after which the property reverts to the owner.
Legal duty - the responsibility to others to act according to the law.
Loss of use - circumstances where a property cannot be occupied in the normal way, through the negligence or wrongdoing of another party.
Notice to quit - a notification or communication to a tenant to leave specified premises usually for a breach of terms of the lease.
Occupancy - holding, possessing, or occupying premises.
Occupant - someone who occupies a particular place.
Partition - the division into parts of property held jointly, or the sale of such property by a court with division of the proceeds.
Party wall - a wall that divides two separate premises, which is the joint responsibility of both owners.
Premises - a building or part of a building usually including the adjacent grounds.
Quit - for a tenant to move out of rented premises.
Reasonable wear and tear - damage sustained in the course of normal use.
Repossess - to take possession again of a property or goods after non-payment of money owed. This might follow a court order.
Search - an inspection carried out to establish whether any legal restraints, planning applications or aspects of legal ownership might affect the purchase of a property. Solicitors will look into land registry and local government records when pursuing this.
Sublease - a lease that is given by a tenant of part or all of the leased premises, to another person for a period shorter than the original lease, while still retaining some interest.
Tenancy - the temporary possession or occupancy of property that belongs to another. It also refers to the period of a tenant's possession.
Tenure - the way in which a property is held eg freehold tenure or leasehold tenure.
Trespass - a wilful act or active negligence that causes an injury to a person or the invasion of their property.
Vendee - the person to whom a property is sold.
Vendor - the person who is selling a property.
latin contracts terms and definitions glossary
Note: terms highlighted in bold within the current definitions (eg mala fides) are explained elsewhere in this guide.
Ab initio (ab init) - from the beginning. Can mean that breaking some terms in a long-running contract results in the contract having been broken from the start.
Bona fide - in good faith. Usually implies an amount of trust that the parties are acting without any hidden motives. The opposite is mala fides - in bad faith.
Bona vacantia - vacant property. Refers to a situation where property or goods end up not being owned by anyone. This can happen if a person dies without heirs or a company is struck off without all its property being distributed. It can also occur where a contract becomes void and property under it cannot be restored to an owner. In the UK, any such property then belongs to the Crown and expensive proceedings are required to get it back.
Caveat emptor - buyer beware. This is a general rule that it is up to the buyer to find out if what they are buying is what they want. Consumer regulations require certain information to be disclosed to consumers and insurance contracts are covered by the uberrimae fides - but many types of business contracts are covered by the caveat emptor rule.
Consensus ad idem - agreement on an idea. This is the concept that the parties to the contract must all be in agreement on the basis of the contract. If it is discovered that the parties were thinking different things, then there is no consensus and the contract is void.
De facto - in fact. The opposite of de jure (in law). Having a practical effect different from the legally accepted or expected situation. For example, a person who deliberately or negligently gives the impression to another party of being a company director, can be treated as a de facto director. So any agreement or statements will bind the company they make as if a properly appointed director made them.
De jure - in law. According to law, the opposite of de facto.
De minimis - short for de minimis non curat lex: the law does not concern itself with trifles. It basically means insignificant or too small to bother with.
De novo - start afresh. Starting a new contract on the same basis as the old.
Exempli gratia (eg) - for example. One or more examples from a greater list of possibilities. Compares with id est (ie), that is, which indicates a full, definitive list of all possibilities.
Ex gratia - out of grace. A gift made without any obligation on the part of the giver or any return from the receiver.
Ex parte - on behalf of. An action, usually a legal action, taken by a party on someone else's behalf.
Ex post facto - because of some later event. Where a later event or occurrence interferes with an earlier agreement.
Id est (ie) - that is. Is followed by a definition or list of items or options that relate to a preceding statement or condition. Differs from exempli gratia (eg) - for example - that gives some, but not all, examples of the items or options.
Inter alia - among other things. This is often used in contracts to indicate that what is being specifically referred to is part of a larger group without having to name all the elements.
Mala fides - bad faith, opposite of bona fide.
Nemo dat quod non habet - no one can give what they do not have. The principle that a seller cannot pass on a better right to the property than they actually have. So, if goods are stolen, the buyer does not get ownership even if there was no indication that they were stolen.
Non compos mentis - not of sound mind. A person who is not of sound mind will not have full capacity to enter into a contract.
Non est factum - not my act. This is a denial by a person that they were actually involved in some action or dealings. In a contract, it can occur if a party denies that they signed the contract - that someone else forged their signature.
Pari passu - equal and even. This relates to shares to denote that newly issued shares have the same rights and restrictions as those of the same class already existing.
Prima facie - at first sight. A prima facie fact is one that seems to be correct, but may subsequently be proved wrong by other evidence.
Pro rata - for the rate. Divided in proportion to some existing split. For example, a pro rata share issue is offered in proportion to the number of shares each shareholder already has.
Pro tanto - for so much. Means to the extent specified, but not more.
Pro tempore (pro tem) - for the time being.
Quid pro quo - something for something. The usual definition of consideration (see the general contracts terms above) in a contract, on the basis that each party should offer something to the other.
Uberrima fides - utmost good faith. The concept that a party to certain types of contract must act in good faith and declare all relevant facts to the other side even if they do not ask. This only usually applies to insurance contracts where the insured person must declare all known risks. It is an exemption to the general contract rule of caveat emptor.
PS. A very good website for legal information and explanation of legal and latin terms. J.F.
Apologies the article about 'the loan shark' was from an ITV News item, that I found during an internet search. regards Joe.
Offline
Selected Land Law Terms
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/qanda/books/11land/terns/
bailment - n. The transfer of the possession of goods by the owner (the bailor) to another (the bailee) for a particular purpose. Examples of bailments are the hiring of goods, the loan of goods, the pledge of goods, and the delivery of goods for carriage, safe custody, or repair. Ownership of the goods remains in the bailor, who has the right to demand their return or direct their disposal at the end of the period (if any) fixed for the bailment or (if no period is fixed) at will. This right will, however, be qualified by any lien the bailee may have over the goods. Bailment exists independently of contract. But if the bailor receives payment for the bailment (a bailment for reward) there is often an express contract setting out the rights and obligations of the parties. A bailment for which the bailor receives no reward (e.g. the loan of a book to a friend) is called a gratuitous bailment.
beneficiary - n.1. A person entitled to benefit from a trust. The beneficiary holds a beneficial interest in the property of which a trustee holds the legal interest. A beneficiary was formerly known as the cestui que trust.
2. One who benefits from a will.
charge - n.1. A formal accusation of a crime, usually made by the police after interrogation. See also indictment.
2. Instructions given by a judge to a jury.
3. A legal or equitable interest in land, securing the payment of money. It gives the creditor in whose favour the charge is created (the chargee) the right to payment from the income or proceeds of sale of the land charged, in priority to claims against the debtor by unsecured creditors. Under the Law of Property Act 1925 the only valid legal charges are: (1) a rentcharge payable immediately and for a fixed period or in perpetuity; (2) a charge by way of legal mortgage; and (3) certain charges arising under statute (e.g. under the Charging Orders Act 1979). All others take effect as equitable interests. All mortgages and charges over registered land must be registered to be enforceable against purchases of the land; both legal mortgages and equitable charges over unregistered land must be registered as land charges unless the mortgagee or chargee holds the title deeds as security (see registration of encumbrances).
4. An interest in company property created in favour of a creditor (e.g. as a debenture holder) to secure the amount owing. Most charges must be registered at the Companies Registry. A fixed charge is attached to specific assets (e.g. premises, plant and machinery) and while in force prevents the company from dealing freely with those assets without the consent of the lender. A floating charge does not immediately attach to any specific assets but 'floats' over all the company's assets until crystallization. Until this point the company is free to deal freely with such assets; this type of charge is suitable for circulating assets (e.g. cash, stock in trade), whose values must necessarily fluctuate. In the event of the company not paying the debt the creditor can secure the amount owing in accordance with the terms of the charge. If the company goes into liquidation (see winding-up) the order for repayment of debts laid down under the Insolvency Act 1986 is that fixed-charge holders are paid before floating-charge holders. A charge can also be created upon shares. For example, the articles of association usually give the company a lien in respect of unpaid calls, and company members may, in order to secure a debt owed to a third party, charge their shares, either by a full transfer of shares coupled with an agreement to retransfer upon repayment of the debt or by a deposit of the share certificate.
contingent interest - An interest that can only come into being upon the occurrence of a specified event (for example when A conveys land to B provided he marries). As a contingent interest can only come into being in the future, if at all, it cannot exist as a legal estate in land. Before 1997, such a transaction created a settlement to which the Settled Land Act 1925 applied. From 1997, such a transaction gives rise to a trust of land under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. Contingent interests are consequently equitable interests only. Compare conditional interest; determinable interest.
contract - n. A legally binding agreement. Agreement arises as a result of offer and acceptance, but a number of other requirements must be satisfied for an agreement to be legally binding. (1) There must be consideration (unless the contract is by deed). (2) The parties must have an intention to create legal relations. This requirement usually operates to prevent a purely domestic or social agreement from constituting a contract (see also honour clause). (3) The parties must have capacity to contract. (4) The agreement must comply with any formal legal requirements. In general, no particular formality is required for the creation of a valid contract. It may be oral, written, partly oral and partly written, or even implied from conduct. Certain transactions are, however, valid only if effected by deed (e.g. transfers of shares in British ships) or in writing (e.g. promissory notes, contracts for the sale of interests in land, and guarantees that can at law only be enforced if evidenced in writing). (5) The agreement must be legal (see illegal contract). (6) The agreement must not be rendered void either by some common-law or statutory rule or by some inherent defect, such as operative mistake (see void contract). Certain contracts, though valid, may be liable to be set aside by one of the parties on such grounds as misrepresentation or the exercise of undue influence (see voidable contract).
deed - n. A written document that must make it clear on its face that it is intended to be a deed and validly executed as a deed. Before 31 July 1990, all deeds required a seal in order to be validly executed, but this requirement was abolished by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. A deed executed since that date by an individual requires only that it must be signed by its maker in the presence of a witness, or at the maker's direction and in the presence of two witnesses, and delivered. Deeds executed by companies require before delivery the signature of a director and secretary, or two directors, of the company; alternatively, if the company has a seal, the deed may be executed by affixing the company seal. If the deed is a contractual document, it is referred to as a specialty. A promise contained in a deed is called a covenant and is binding even if not supported by consideration. Covenants may be either express or implied. A deed normally takes effect on delivery; actual delivery constitutes handing it to the other party; constructive delivery involved (in strict theory) touching the seal with the finger, and saying words such as "I deliver this as my act and deed". If a deed is delivered but is not to become operative until a future date or until some condition has been fulfilled, it is called an escrow. The recitals of a deed are those parts that merely declare facts and do not effect any of the substance of the transaction. They are usually inserted to explain the reason for the transaction. The operative part of a deed is the part that actually effects the objects of the deed, as by transferring land. The testatum (or witnessing part) constitutes the opening words of the operative part, i.e. "Now this deed witnesseth as follows". The premises are the words in the operative part that describe the parties and the transaction involved. The parcels are the words in the premises that describe the property involved. The testimonium is the concluding part, beginning "In witness whereof", and containing the signatures of the parties and witnesses. The locus sigilli is the position indicated for placing the seal. When a deed refers to itself as "these presents", "presents" means present statements. The advantage of a deed over an ordinary contract is that the limitation period is 12 rather than 6 years (see limitation of actions) and no consideration is required for the deed to be enforceable. See also deed poll.
determinable interest - An interest that will automatically come to an end on the occurrence of some specified event (which, however, may never happen). For example, if A conveys land to B until he marries, B has a determinable interest that would pass back to A upon his marriage. But if B dies a bachelor the possibility of a reverter to A is destroyed and B's heirs acquire an absolute interest. An interest that must end at some future point (e.g. a life interest) is not classified as a determinable interest, but one that could end during a person's life (for example a protective trust) is so classified. A determinable legal estate in land prior to 1925 was known as a determinable fee, but under the Law of Property Act 1925 it can now exist only as an equitable interest. It is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between a determinable interest and a conditional interest. Compare contingent interest.
easement - n. A right enjoyed by the owner of land (the dominant tenement) to a benefit from other land (the servient tenement). An easement benefits and binds the land itself and therefore continues despite any change of ownership of either dominant or servient tenement, although it will be extinguished if the two tenements come into common ownership (compare quasi-easement). It may be acquired by statute (for example, local Acts of Parliament), expressly granted (e.g. by deed giving a right of way), arise by implication (e.g. an easement of support from an adjoining building), or be acquired by prescription. (See also profit à prendre.) An easement can exist as either a legal or an equitable interest in land. Only easements created by statute, deed, or prescription and held on terms equivalent to a fee simple absolute in possession or term of years absolute qualify as legal easements and are binding on all who acquire the unregistered servient tenement or any interest in it. Legal easements over registered land should be registered, but in practice will usually be binding without registration. All others are equitable easements and must generally be registered to be enforceable against a third party who acquires the servient tenement for value in money or money's worth. Under section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925, when land is conveyed, all easements appertaining to it automatically pass with it without the necessity for express words in the conveyance. See also registration of encumbrances.
equitable interests - Interests in property originally recognized by the Court of Chancery, as distinct from legal interests recognized in the common-law courts. They arose in cases when it was against the principles of equity for a person to enforce a legal right. Originally equitable rights (e.g. a trust, or the equity of redemption under a mortgage) were enforceable against the person with a legal right over property in question. Later, however, those who were given the property by the holder of the legal interests took it subject to equitable interests; later still, anyone who bought property knowing of the equitable interests was bound by them. In the developed law, everyone took property subject to equitable interests except those who bought it and neither knew nor ought to have known of the equitable interests (the doctrine of notice). Since 1925, equitable interests may be protected by the doctrine of overreaching, under the system of land charges, or by notice.
equity of redemption - The rights of a mortgagor over his mortgaged property, particularly the right to redeem the property. This right of redemption allows a mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property at any time on payment of principal, interest, and costs, even after the contractual date of redemption, as stated in the mortgage deed, has passed. Any clogs on the equity of redemption are void, but the mortgagor's rights may be terminated under certain circumstances (see mortgage).
Before 1926 a mortgage was commonly effected by the transfer of the mortgagor's interest in the property to the mortgagee, but the mortgagor's rights were recognized by equity. Since 1925 the mortgagor retains legal ownership of the property in all cases: the term equity of redemption is still used, however, although the right to redeem is no longer strictly an equitable interest.
estate owner(s) - The owner of a legal estate in land
fee simple absolute in possession - One of only two forms of ownership of land that, under the Law of Property Act 1925, can exist as a legal estate (see also term of years absolute). All others take effect as equitable interests. Fee simple indicates ownership that is not liable to end upon any person's death, with the expiration of time, or on the failure of a particular line of heirs. Absolute means that the owner's rights are not conditional or liable to terminate on the occurrence of any event (except the exercise of a right of re-entry - Law of Property (Amendment) Act 1926). In possession means that the owner's rights are immediate, thus future interests do not qualify, but possession need not imply actual physical occupation (for instance, a person in receipt of rents and profits can be said to be in possession).
incumbrance - see encumbrance (incumbrance) n. A right or interest in land owned by someone other than the owner of the land itself; examples include easements, leases, mortgages, and restrictive covenants. When title to the land is registered (see land registration), encumbrances other than minor and overriding interests are recorded in the Charges Register. Certain encumbrances affecting unregistered land will only be enforceable against third parties if registered at the Land Charges Registry. See also registration of encumbrances.
land certificate - A document issued by the Land Registry to the proprietor of registered land as proof of his ownership of it. See land registration.
legal estate - Ownership of land or an interest in land either in fee simple absolute in possession or for a term of years absolute. Under the Law of Property Act 1925 these are the only forms of ownership that can exist as legal estates in land. All other forms, e.g. life interests and entailed interests, are equitable only.
Legal interest - n.(in land law) A right in or over land. It may comprise equitable ownership of the land (such as the interest of the tenant for life under a settlement), where the legal estate is owned by trustees; or the benefit of some other right over the land of another, such as an easement or rentcharge. Interests of the latter type can be legal or equitable, but under the Law of Property Act 1925 only interests owned on terms equivalent to a fee simple absolute in possession or a term of years absolute qualify as legal interests. A person interested in land is one who has rights in it. See also equitable interests.
minor interests Interests in registered land that cannot be created or transferred by registered disposition, are not overriding interests, and could be overridden by a registered proprietor unless protected by registration. Such interests include the equitable interests of beneficiaries under a settlement and all charges that would be registrable at the Land Charges Department if the land had been unregistered (see registration of encumbrances). Minor interests are protected by registration of a notice, caution, inhibition, or restriction as appropriate.
mortgage - n. An interest in property created as a form of security for a loan or payment of a debt and terminated on payment of the loan or debt. The borrower, who offers the security, is the mortgagor; the lender, who provides the money, is the mortgagee. Virtually any property may be mortgaged (though land is the most common); exceptions include the salaries of public officials. The name is derived from Old French (literally: dead pledge), since at common law failure to repay on the due date of redemption (which in most mortgages is set very early) formerly resulted in the mortgagor losing all his rights over the property. By the rules of equity the mortgagor is now allowed to redeem his property at any time on payment of the loan together with interest and costs (see equity of redemption). The mortgagee has a right to take possession of the mortgaged property as soon as the mortgage is made, irrespective of whether the mortgagor has defaulted. However, this right (1) must only be used for the purpose of protecting or enforcing the security, (2) may be excluded by agreement, or (3) is subject to a power in the court to adjourn proceedings for possession, to suspend the execution of an order for possession, or to postpone the date for delivery of possession, where the mortgaged property is a dwelling house (Administration of Justice Act 1970 as amended). This right is normally used as a preliminary to an exercise of the mortgagee's power of sale. In face of continued nonpayment of the loan, the mortgagee may sell the mortgaged property under a power of sale, appoint a receiver, or obtain a decree of foreclosure.
Under the Law of Property Act 1925 the only valid legal mortgages are (1) a lease subject to cesser on redemption and (2) a deed expressed to be a charge by way of legal mortgage (see charge). All other mortgages are equitable interests only (see equitable mortgage). All mortgages of registered land are noted in the charges register on application by the mortgagee (see land registration), and a charge certificate is issued to him. When mortgaged land is unregistered, a first legal mortgagee keeps the title deeds. A subsequent legal mortgagee and any equitable mortgagee who does not have the title deeds should protect his interests by registration (see puisne mortgage; registration of encumbrances). See also priority of mortgages.
notice - n.1. Knowledge of a fact. A person is said to have actual notice of anything that he actually knows; constructive notice of anything that he ought reasonably to know (for example, any fact that he would have discovered if he had made any inquiry that a reasonable man would have made); and imputed notice of anything of which any agent of his has actual or constructive notice.
2. (in employment law) Formal notification, given by either of the parties to a contract of employment, that the contract is to be terminated after a specified period. The period of notice to which each party is entitled is governed by the contract, subject to statutory minimum periods if the employee has been continuously employed in the business (see continuous employment) for more than four weeks. An employee who has been so employed for up to two years is entitled to a week's notice; one employed for a longer period is entitled to one week's notice for each year's continuous employment up to 12 years. Thus an employee who has been employed for 20 years must be given a statutory minimum of 12 weeks' notice, although his employment contract may entitle him to a longer period, which takes priority. An employee with four weeks' continuous employment must give at least one week's notice of his resignation. An employee whose conduct justifies immediate dismissal is treated as waiving his right to notice, as is an employer whose conduct amounts to constructive dismissal. A fixed-term contract cannot be terminated by notice unless the contract expressly provides for this.
3. (in land law) An entry against a registered title that may be lodged by a person with a right or interest in the land comprised in the title. The rights and interests that may be protected by a notice are listed in the Land Registration Act 1925, and a notice must always specify the right or interest it seeks to protect. A notice differs from a caution or an inhibition in that dealings with the land affected may still take place, but they will have effect subject to the right or interest protected by the notice.
4. (in Community legislation) A nonbinding document. Notices are often issued by the European Commission to explain further details of a competition regulation, for example in relation to exclusive distribution and purchasing agreements, cooperation agreements, subcontracting agreements, agency agreements, and the distinction between cooperative and concentrative joint ventures. Notices are not binding on the Commission, whereas regulations are; however, in practice it would be very rare for the Commission to depart from policies set out in a notice.
overriding interests Certain rights and interests in registered land, listed in the Land Registration Act 1925, that cannot be protected by registration but, unless overreached, will bind the registered proprietor and any third party acquiring the land or any interest in it. The list includes legal easements and profits à prendre, rights of persons in actual occupation, rights acquired under the Limitation Acts (see limitation of actions), and leases granted for terms of up to 21 years.
prescription - n.1. (in land law) The acquisition for the benefit of one's own land (the dominant tenement) of an easement or profit à prendre over another's land (the servient tenement) by uninterrupted use over a long period. A person claiming a right by prescription must show that his use did not have the servient owner's permission and was not kept secret or exercised by force. Under the Prescription Act 1832 most easements may be acquired by prescription over 20 years, the period being extended when the servient owner is under a disability (e.g. a child or person of unsound mind), although 40 years' use establishes an absolute and indefeasible right. The periods are 30 and 60 years in the case of profits. An absolute easement of light is acquired after 20 years' use. Rights can also be acquired at common law under the doctrine of lost modern grant, or by proof of continuous use since time immemorial, i.e. since 1189.
2. (in international law) The acquisition of title to territory through an uncontested exercise of sovereignty over an extended period of time. Prescription presupposes a prior sovereign authority whose control and administration over the territory in question has lapsed through (1) failure to occupy, (2) failure to administer, (3) abandonment or neglect, (4) a wrongful original claim, or (5) failure to contest a new claim.
profit à prendre - The right to take soil, minerals, or produce (such as wood, turf, or fish) from another's land (the servient tenement) or to graze animals on it. It may exist as a legal or equitable interest. The right may be enjoyed exclusively by one person (a several profit) or by one person in common with others (a common). A profit may exist in gross (i.e. existing independently of any ownership of land by the person entitled) and may be exercisable without any limit on the amount of produce taken. It may be sold, bequeathed, or otherwise dealt with. Profits existing for the benefit of the owner's land (the dominant tenement) are generally exercisable only to the extent to which the dominant tenement can benefit. They may be appurtenant, when the nature of the right depends on the terms of the grant; or pur cause de vicinage (Norman French: because of vicinity), in respect of cattle grazing the dominant tenement and straying onto the unfenced adjacent servient tenement. Profits may be created by express or implied grant or by statute; profits appurtenant may also arise by prescription (or presumed grant). They may be extinguished (1) by an express release; (2) by the owner occupying the servient tenement; or (3) by implied release (e.g. through abandonment, which may be presumed through long non-user, through changes to the dominant tenement that make enjoyment of the right unnecessary or impossible, or through an irreversible alteration of the servient tenement).
puisne mortgage A legal mortgage of unregistered land in which the mortgagee does not keep the title deeds of the land as security. Usually a first mortgagee retains the deeds; thus subsequent mortgages will be puisne and should be protected by registration (see registration of encumbrances).
restriction - n.(in land law) A limitation of the right of a registered proprietor to deal with the land or charge in a registered title. For instance, a beneficiary may enter a restriction against his trustees if the trust provides that the land may not be sold without the beneficiary's consent. A restriction may also be entered by, or with the concurrence of, the registered proprietor, and there are cases in which the Chief Land Registrar is obliged to enter a restriction (for example, when persons are registered as joint proprietors, and the survivor will not have power to give a valid receipt for capital money arising on a disposition of the land).
restrictive covenant - An obligation created by deed that curtails the rights of an owner of land; for example, a covenant not to use the land for the purposes of any business. A covenant imposing a positive obligation on the landowner (the covenantor), for example to repair fences, is not a restrictive covenant. Third parties who acquire freehold land affected by a restrictive covenant will be bound by it if it is registered (see registration of encumbrances) or, in the case of covenants created before 1926, if they are aware or ought to be aware of it (see constructive notice). The covenant may also be enforceable by successors of the original beneficiary (the covenantee) if it was annexed to (i.e. expressly taken for the benefit of) the covenantee's land or if the benefit of it was expressly assigned. Section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 has been interpreted as providing a form of statutory annexation. Thus, unless there is an express stipulation to the contrary, all covenants shall be deemed binding on successors to the original covenantee. The benefit of a covenant will not be annexed, however, if the covenantee's land is not actually capable of benefiting from the covenant; for example, if it is too far away to be affected. Restrictive covenants contained in leases are not registrable but are nevertheless generally enforceable between third parties (see covenant running with the land). See also building scheme.
settlor - n. A person who creates a settlement. In a broad sense the term includes testators; in a more restricted sense it signifies one who settles property during his life.
term of years absolute - A leasehold estate in land: a term of years that may or may not be brought to an end by notice, forfeiture, or any other event except the death of any person. Thus a lease "to X for 25 years if Y shall so long live" is not a valid term of years absolute. Under the Law of Property Act 1925 a term of years absolute can exist as a legal estate provided it is created in the required manner, i.e. by deed in the case of a term of three years or more.
title - n.1. A person's right of ownership of property. Someone with a good title has adequate evidence to establish his right. See absolute title; qualified title; title deeds.
2. The heading of an Act of Parliament, which may be a long title or a short title.
3. The name of a particular court action, which is derived from the heading of the originating process that initiated it.
trust - n.1. An arrangement in which a settlor transfers property to one or more trustees, who will hold it for the benefit of one or more persons (the beneficiaries or cestuis que trust, who may include the trustee(s) or the settlor) who are entitled to enforce the trust, if necessary by action in court. The trust, recognized originally in Chancery, is based on confidence and developed from the use; it has been described as the most important contribution of English equity to jurisprudence. The beneficiary has rights against the trustee and may also have rights over the property in the hands of others (see tracing trust property). When a sole beneficiary is 18 or over, sane, and entitled to all the trust property, he may require the trustees to transfer that property to him; this applies equally when all the beneficiaries are 18 or over, sane, and likewise entitled. For a trust to exist, the three certainties must be present: certainty of intention (i.e. to create a trust), certainty of subject matter (the property in the trust), and certainty of objects (those who will or may benefit under the trust).
There are few formal technical requirements necessary for the creation of a trust, except where land is concerned, though express trusts are usually found in professionally drafted documents. Trusts are also commonly used to protect an individual's (or company's) ownership of property, when it is feared that the possessor of the property may become insolvent. See active trust; charitable trust; discretionary trust; executed trust; express trust; implied trust; protective trust; secret trust; statutory trust.
2. (in the National Health Service) See NHS Trust; Primary Care Trust.
trustee - n. A person having a nominal title to property that he holds for the benefit of one or more others, the beneficiaries (see trust). Trustees may be individuals or corporate bodies (see trust corporation) and can include such specialists as judicial trustees, custodian trustees, and the Public Trustee. A trustee must show a high standard of care towards his beneficiaries, must not allow his interests to conflict with those of his beneficiaries, and must not profit from his trust. He is not usually entitled to remuneration although he may recover expenses necessarily incurred (see charging clause). Trustees may refuse their office, retire, or resign, but they remain liable for acts carried out during their trusteeship. The power to appoint replacement trustees is usually given either to the beneficiaries or to the remaining trustees; in default the court will appoint replacement trustees. Trustees have a wide range of powers and duties, including a duty to act equally between the beneficiaries and a power to advance money to them (see advancement). In the exercise of their duties they are answerable to the court.
Source: A Dictionary of Law. Ed. Elizabeth A. Martin. Oxford University Press, 2002. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. 26 January 2005 www.oxfordreference.com
PS. Found this website with legal definitions in relation to Land Law, hope the definitions may be useful. J.F.
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THE IRISH TIMES Monday, February 16, 2009 Page 4 Home News.
Law Society rejects ‘self-justification’ of ex-solicitor.
Behaviour of Michael Lynn was ‘shameful and disgraceful’ says director general: Carol Coulter Legal Affairs Editor.
The Director general of the Law Society has rejected the “self-justification” of former solicitor Michael Lynn published in an interview in the Mail on Sunday, of which excerpts were also broadcast on RTE yesterday.
Ken Murphy said that the behaviour of Mr Lynn, who was struck off the Roll of Solicitors over a year ago, was “shameful and disgraceful” and pointed out that the society was still paying compensation from its compensation fund to clients who had lost money because of his activities.
Mr. Lynn fled abroad at the end of 2007 and a warrant was issued for his arrest in December that year after he failed to appear in court.
There are 130 sets of legal proceedings against him from banks and other financial institutions, and from many of his clients, and his debts have been estimated at E80 million.
The Law Society has handed its files on him to gardai, who wish to question him in connection with allegations of fraud.
However, they have been unable to locate him, and no charges have been laid. Because no charges have been issued, he cannot be arrested in another country and extradited.
In the interview, which did not disclose Mr. Lynn’s present whereabouts, the disgraced former solicitor and property developer said he was willing to return to Ireland and “face up to my responsibilities”.
But he said he was travelling around Europe attempting to secure the investments of those who had put money into his business, as far as was possible, and this was his first priority.
He rejected the allegation that, by taking out multiple mortgages on the same properties he had committed fraud.
“It’s true I had extensive borrowings. That’s absolutely true,” he said in the interview. But it’s also true that the acts I engage in and the misguided deeds – on the basis of advice from professionals and the acceptance of certain parties – was probably misguided. But was it fraudulent? I do not believe so.”
He insisted that the banks “couldn’t get enough of me. When they were considering the merits of giving me a loan for an asset at home they would know about my development abroad. That’s their decision. They were their choices and it was all of our choices to borrow money.
“I can’t return until I have the investors absolutely secured,” he said. He also indicated he was willing to go to prison for “one month, two months, three months,” he added that he did not see why he should.
“I wouldn’t see any reason why I would have to go to prison and the one thing I want to make clear is that I am not going to be a scape-goat for others,” he said.
“I am not going to be used as an example of what was recognised as an acceptable form and practice of business by bankers, lawyers, accountants and auctioneers. I am not going to be the poster boy who ends up in prison to my cost alone.”
PS. It is incredible that it is indicated that solicitor Michael Lynn is referred to as ‘He rejected the allegation that, by taking out multiple mortgages on the same properties he had committed fraud.’
When Michael Lynn says, “I am not going to be used as an example of what was recognised as an acceptable form and practice of business by bankers, lawyers, accountants and auctioneers. I am not going to be the poster boy who ends up in prison to my cost alone.”
Can we take it the ‘acceptable form and practice of business by bankers, lawyers, accountants and auctioneers’ was that of ‘taking out multiple mortgages on the same properties’ ?
It is small wonder that George Bernard Shaw, was quoted as saying “that the professionals exist to rob the common man”
Is not the ‘Credit- Crunch’ evidence of how the ‘bankers, lawyers, accountants and auctioneers’ have now robbed all the ordinary decent people in Ireland and throughout the world? J.F.
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Pilot defaults on €8m loans for property speculations
By Ray Managh
Wednesday February 11 2009
Banks and building societies loaned an Air Corps pilot just short of €8m, turning him into a property tycoon in his spare time, the Circuit Civil Court heard.
Judge Joseph Mathews was told that John Andrew Mulkearns, of Iona Road, Glasnevin, Dublin, at the height of his property investments, owned 12 houses, several held jointly with his wife, Lorna.
Barrister Suzanne Boylan, who successfully overturned a €4,658 installment order imposed on Mrs Mulkearns by a District Court judge, said the property empire had collapsed.
Failed
The court heard Mulkearns owned 101, 101a, 102 and 102a The Green, Thornberry, Letterkenny, Co Donegal, jointly with rogue solicitor Michael Lynn, who had failed to honour undertakings to finance the houses on behalf of the couple.
Mulkearns and his wife jointly owned 15 Weston Crescent Park, Lucan, Co Dublin and 1 and 1a Hillcrest Park, Lucan, and 12a Griffith Drive, Finglas, Dublin.
Mulkearns also owned 8 and 13 Cluain Bui, Lis Cara, Carrick on Shannon, and 12 and 12a Griffith Drive, Finglas, Dublin.
"Apart from the family home at Iona Road, Glasnevin, the remainder of the properties are being given back to the financial institutions who financed their purchase," Ms Boylan said.
She told Judge Mathews that the Mulkearns' family home had already been repossessed by Permanent TSB with a six-months stay, and they would be moving into rented accommodation next April.
The court heard that, on top of the Bank of Ireland judgment for €2,016,000 and interest, there was a judgment for €1,656,102 in favour of Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd, and mortgages in favour of IIB (€1.5m); Irish Nationwide Building Society (€1,058,682); Anglo Irish Bank Corporation (€672,000); Bank of Scotland (€380,000); ACC Bank (€300,000); Permanent Tsb (€260,000) and AIB Lucan (€23,000).
Commercial
Ms Boylan said the Bank of Ireland had given the couple a commercial loan in February 2006 of just over €2m on security of their three Lucan properties, the two Cluain Bui houses and one of the Griffith Drive houses.
She said their solicitor, Michael Lynn, had undertaken to register first legal charges in favour of the bank against the six properties, but he had failed to do this -- leaving the bank unsecured for its €2m-plus loan.
Alan Keating, counsel for Bank of Ireland, said the bank had obtained judgment for €2,016,000 which, with court interest, now amounted to €2,136,051.
The District Court had granted the bank installment orders jointly and severally against the Mulkearns' in the sum of €4,658 a month.
Mrs Mulkearns, who had been sued in her own name of Ms Lorna Farrell, said her husband continued to pay the €4,658 monthly repayments from monthly rental income from their three Lucan houses (€3,000) and partly from his €4,385 a month Air Corps salary.
Imprisonment
She said he looked after the family finances and the only income she had was €505 a month in Children's Allowance. She was not certain what other house she held jointly with her husband.
She said she could face imprisonment in the event of the €4,658 a month not being maintained.
Judge Mathews said that in the event of the payments not being kept up, Mrs Mulkearns could face criminal sanction, which was a scenario he would not contemplate against the mother of three.
He directed that a nil installment order be entered against Mrs Mulkearns.
hnews@herald.ie
- Ray Managh
PS. Is this not a most strange statement:- ‘Judge Mathews said that in the event of the payments not being kept up, Mrs Mulkearns could face criminal sanction, which was a scenario he would not contemplate against the mother of three.’
Why is there not a similar ‘criminal sanction’ against the rogue solicitor Michael Lynn, who is also ‘deeply’ complicit in this case? J.F.
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Irish Independent July 12th 2008.
Barrister to pay liquidator E635,000 over tax claims: By Tim Healy.
Photograph with the caption: Patrick Russell undertook to pay the money by July 24.
A BARRISTER yesterday undertook before the High Court to pay E635,000 in settlement of an action against him, over the money which a company now in liquidation claimed he failed to pass on to the Revenue Commissioners to pay its tax bill.
Last month, Patrick Russell, Steelstown, Rathcoole, Co. Dublin, was given tow weeks by the court to come up with, what a judge said was, a “meaningful” explanation of how he intended to pay back the money. – or face an order for his committal to prison for contempt of court.
Yesterday, Mr. Russell undertook to have a draft for the money by close of business on July 24.
The case arose out of proceedings by the liquidator of the company involved, Ardline Aircon Ltd, part of the REL Refrigeration Group of Hebron Industrial Estate, Kilkenny, claiming Mr. Russell had failed to pass on the E635,000 to discharge its (Ardline’s) tax liabilities.
Last December, the Commercial Court made a winding up order for Ardline, which as around the same time the company got an order freezing Mr. Russell’s assets for the sum of E635,000.
The court heard Mr. Russell had held himself out as an expert on tax affairs with negotiating experience with the Revenue.
The court also said the company had received apparent proof of payments made to the Revenue in the form of two receipts faxed to it by Mr. Russell. It only later discovered the documents were false and were disowned by the Revenue it claimed.
Two weeks ago in the High Court, the Ardline liquidator William O’Riordan, sought Mr. Russell’s committal to prison because he had failed to comply with a previous court order requiring him to explain, on affidavit, the manner in which he dealt with money given to him since he had taken receipt of it from the company.
Affidavit
He was given until yesterday to provide the affidavit.
Mr. Justice Liam McKechnie was yesterday told proposals had now been made by Mr. Russell’s lawyer to deal with the matter.
Counsel for the Ardline liquidator said that Mr. Russell was prepared to give an undertaking to pay E635,000 “in full and final settlement of the action”.
Mr. Russell got into the witness box and said he undertook to have the money ready and payable to the solicitors for the liquidator before the close of business on July 24. The matter was adjourned on that basis.
PS. Would it not have been proper for the Gardai to charge Barrister Patrick Russell with fraudulently using a ‘false instrument’?
The following case was that of fraudulently using a ‘false instrument’ in Northern Ireland and resulted in a prison sentence:-
The Queen v George Ignatius Martin and Mary Martin
http://www.courtsni.gov.uk/courtsni/Tem … HINT=Guest
Neutral Citation No.: [2009] NICC 10 Ref: HAR7369
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down Delivered: 13/2/2009
(subject to editorial corrections)*
IN THE CROWN COURT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
________
DOWNPATRICK CROWN COURT
(SITTING AT BELFAST)
________
THE QUEEN
-v-
GEORGE IGNATIUS MARTIN and MARY MARTIN
________
HART J
[1] The defendants are husband and wife and have pleaded guilty to four counts under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, one of forgery contrary to s. 1, and one of using a forged instrument contrary to s. 3, both in respect of a document dated 17 December 1997; and two further similar counts in respect of a document dated 25 January 2000.
[19] I am satisfied that this is a case where immediate custodial sentences are required. I see no reason to distinguish between the defendants and I consider that the least sentence I can impose is one of six months’ imprisonment on each count, the sentences will run concurrently.
Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 1981 CHAPTER 45
3 The offence of using a false instrument
‘It is an offence for a person to use an instrument which is, and which he knows or believes to be, false, with the intention of inducing somebody to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice.’
PS again. Is there not comparable legislation in the Republic of Ireland for the criminal prosecution of Barrister Patrick Russell for ‘documents (that) were false and were disowned by the Revenue’ ? J.F.
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Newsletter, Saturday, April 4, 2009.
Father’s anger at Judge’s defence of sentencing By Laura Murphy lauramurphy@newsletter.co.uk
Photograph with caption:- KILLED Aaron Montgomery
Photograph with caption:- MOURNING: Stephen Montgomery at his son Aaron’s graveside at the Church of Ireland, Aghalee picture: Brian Little.
THE father of a man killed outside a Belfast nightspot has said comments from a top Ulster judge, about a lack of leniency in sentencing are like “sticking a knife” in his family.
Stephen Montgomery – whose son Aaron, 23, died after being punched outside a Belfast city centre nightclub last February – was speaking after Lord Chief Justice Sir Brian Kerr said sentences handed out to criminals here were “at least as severe” as anywhere else in the UK or Republic of Ireland.
Last month a teenager from Belfast pleaded guilty to Aaron’s manslaughter and was sentenced to two years in prison.
But Mr. Montgomery, from Moira, said he has lost all faith in Northern Ireland’s legal system, and wants to fight to get justice for his dead son by pressing for tougher jail terms.
Speaking to the BBC, Sir Brian had rejected claims that judges were out of touch, stating: “My conviction is that those who make a study of the sentencing trends in Northern Ireland will have a very different picture from that which I recognise is the popular conception.”
But his remarks have left Stephen Montgomery “absolutely disgusted”.
“We were treated as if we had committed some kind of crime whilst everything was geared towards Ciaran Laverty,” he said referring to the 19-year-old who delivered the blow that killed Aaron.
“He got to sit his exams, they put the case back for him – what he wanted he got. And we got nothing.”
“His (Laverty’s) teachers brought in school reports which I could have done about Aaron, he was a model student.”
“My son was a good young man who never did anyone any harm. This Ciaran Laverty hit him from behind.”
“Aaron had been giving a rose to a girl at the time as it was Valentine’s night.”
“For anyone to say that sentences here are not too lenient – I just can’t get the words to say how I feel. I am so angry.”
“We have gone thorough enough without people making comments like this. I just feel that the more things like this are said, the more it’s like sticking a knife into us.”
Mr. Montgomery said the death of Aaron had “completely destroyed” his family.
And he revealed that his wife Jacqueline had to put a pillow over her face at night so the couples two other children, 22-year- old Adam and 18-year-old Rachel didn’t hear her crying herself to sleep.
He also hit out at the Public Prosecution Service, claiming they “never kept us informed of anything”.
“They didn’t seem to care Laverty was pleading guilty to manslaughter and they knew they were getting a conviction, so they were happy enough.”
“We’ve lost all faith in the legal system. I brought my kids up to respect the law but it has let us down very badly.”
“It’s all for the villains and criminals of this country. Ciaran Laverty got the best defence team in this country. There were no rights for us whatsoever.”
Mr. Montgomery also revealed his family had only got the rest of their son’s remains less than two weeks ago – the absence of which hung heavy in his mind every time he went to his grave at Aghalee.
“They had kept his brain and part of his spine. When I went to his grave I knew he wasn’t all there and it was destroying me and eating me up.”
He said he knew that his family was not the only one suffering in this way, and that the only people who could change such a fact were “the people up in Stormont”. He added: “It’s up to them to get this done.
“Some poor family down the line will have to go through the same thing (we are going through).
“I am a small fish in a big pond and there are people with more clout than me. I feel I have to do something for my family, my son, because he was a good lad.”
Time up for family to lodge appeal
IT was open to the Montgomery family to write to the Attorney General to ask her to consider referring the sentence given to Ciaran Laverty to the Court of Appeal, the Public Prosecution Service confirmed.
But they must do this within 28 days after sentencing – and that time restriction was up yesterday.
The Criminal Justice Act 1988 gives the Attorney General the power to apply for leave to refer a sentence she considers unduly lenient to the Court of Appeal.
This power is restricted to the more serious offences tried in the Crown Court.
The PPS Code for Prosecutors explains that, to be considered unduly lenient, a sentence needs to fall outside the range of sentence that a judge, having consideration of all relevant factors and regard to sentencing guidance, could reasonably consider appropriate.
The Court of Appeal has issued guidelines for ranges of sentences for certain types of offences.
Delivering his judgement on the case of Ciaran Laverty, Mr. Justice Hart said that he was “satisfied that this case is one which falls within the range of cases where the appropriate sentence on a plea of guilty is between two and six years’ imprisonment.”
PS. From reading this article it is just so sad that Aaron Montgomery an innocent young man should be killed in an unprovoked attack and yet this is not prosecuted on behalf of the Crown as murder by the PPS.
If a family member of either:- Judge Sir Anthony Hart or Lord Chief Justice Sir Brian Kerr were killed in such ‘tragic’ circumstances, would the PPS be as passive in accepting a manslaughter plea? J.F.
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SUNDAY WORLD March 25, 2007 Page 14.
Why are we so scared of our judges?
ONCE more, people are unhappy at a particularly lenient sentence handed down by a particular judge to a particular piece of worthless humanity.
There has been great debate on the matter in newspapers and in our airwaves ever since that rapist walked free.
But almost everywhere, undue deference is paid to the bewigged ones.
People tip-toe around them, metaphorically bow and scrape when they mention judges by name or otherwise.
There seems to be some kind of notion abroad, that judges, by their very nature, are in some way superior than the rest of us, that they are somehow more intelligent, that God, for reasons best known to himself, has bestowed on them infinite wisdom.
Nonsense.
Judges are civil servants.
They are lawyers who, for whatever reason decided to accept an offer from the Government to become judges.
Snootily
They are there to do our bidding and not their own.
They sit in criminal courts as part of a system designed to keep the people of the country safe and to ensure the wrongdoers pay for their crimes.
They are in civil courts to ensure that civil disputes are settled quickly, fairly and if possible, amicably.
They are not there to pontificate, to look down on the rest of us, to snootily lecture us or to ignore the wishes of our elected representatives.
God knows why our laws make it difficult to get rid of them.
It took an age to rid us of Brian Curtain and we all know what he, er, didn’t do.
But it is all but impossible to dump a judge because he is simply a lousy judge.
There is no simple mechanism for showing the door to a judge who can’t or won’t do his job properly.
It’s time to change all that.
Time to make it easier to turf them out if they’re not performing.
That makes it all political, you say.
So, how do you think the bulk of them got there in the first place?
PS. The ordinary decent hard-working people like Mr. Montgomery, pay their taxes and pay the wages of the civil servants such as the judges.
How can it be that the ordinary decent hard-working person can be treated so badly by judges, who are accountable, only to themselves?
Is it a case that ‘power corrupts’ and ‘absolute power corrupts absolutely’? J.F.
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Irish Times 18th June 2008.
Ex-solicitor’s excuses worthy of Puck Fair.
“THE EXCUSES” of a former solicitor from Co. Kerry during a long-running dispute over enforcement of disciplinary measures against him would have surprised “three-card trick men at Puck Fair”, the president of the High Court said yesterday.
Mr. Justice Richard Johnson made the remarks after ordering Colm Murphy, who formerly practised as Colm Murphy and Co., Market Street, Kenmare, to pay the costs of High Court applications by the Law Society aimed at forcing him to comply with orders relating to his professional conduct.
The High Court that to get Mr. Murphy to comply, the society was forced to bring proceedings which could have led to his jailing.
Mr. Justice Johnson said he was surprised an application to attach and commit Mr. Murphy had not been brought much earlier. He was referring to matters which arose from a complaint from one of Mr. Murphy’s clients in July 1999 and were only resolved in November 2007 when Mr. Murphy finally complied with his obligations.
The judge said he was quite satisfied nothing was done by Mr. Murphy until the attachment and committal application was made.
“I was given excuses which would have amazed theologians of a medieval nature in their dexterity and which would even have surprised three-card trick men at Puck Fair in the manner they were applied,” Mr. Justice Johnson said.
Mr. Murphy objected to the society being awarded costs. He said the attachment wand committal proceedings were not necessary as he was doing his best at all times to fulfil his commitments.
In May 2001, the Law Society found Mr. Murphy had provided inadequate professional services arising out of two complaints made against him in 1999, Paul Anthony McDermott, for the society, told the court.
Mr. Murphy was ordered to refund IR£4,000 in client fees and make a contribution of IR£1,000 to the society’s fees.
He neither made the payments nor appealed that finding and on October 21st 2003 the Solicitor’s Disciplinary Tribunal made a finding of misconduct. The tribunal ordered that he pay another E4,000.
The High Court later rejected Mr. Murphy’s application for an extension of time to appeal the original finding of the registrar’s committee.
In 2006, the Law Society took proceedings to try to enforce that finding as well as findings in relation to the alleged wrongful retaining of client files, Mr. McDermott said.
In the meantime, an application by Mr. Murphy to renew his practising certificate in 2005 did not proceed after the society advised him they would refuse it because of the number of complaints against him.
The matter first came before the president of the High Court on January 31st, 2007, when Mr. Murphy indicated he was willing to comply with the original finding against him.
However, he did not comply and the society then brought the application for attachment and committal.
It was not until November last, after the case had been before Mr. Justice Johnson 10 time, that he finally complied, Mr. McDermott said.
This was not before he engaged in “gratuitous abuse” of the society’s officers, saying in an affidavit: “I confirm that I have nothing but disdain and contempt for certain officers of the Law Society.”
Michael Bowman, for Mr. Murphy, said that while the solicitor had been unsuccessful “at every hand’s turn” in relation to other proceedings, there had been no reason for the Law Society to apply for attachment and committal which could have seen him jailed for breaching orders. The references to his contempt for officers of the Law Society were regrettable, Mr. Bowman added.
Ordering Mr. Murphy to pay the costs, Mr. Justice Johnson said Mr. Murphy had “no regard for the standards and requirements of the court or the Law Society”. He found it “bizarre” that Mr. Murphy did not appear to understand the rules of the Law Society.
PS. The President of the High Court Mr. Justice Richard Johnson, would appear to have regained his ‘sense of humour’.
Is this an indication that the President of the High Court Mr. Justice Richard Johnson may now be willing to listen to ‘You Can Never Improve on the Truth’ testimony of the Victims of the Legal Profession Society (VLPS)?
Will the President of the High Court Mr. Justice Richard Johnson, now be receptive to and judge without bias, the VLPS complaints against their specific solicitors? J.F.
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13 die in superbug crisis at NHS district hospital
http://www.metro.co.uk/
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
Worried: East-bourne hospital chief Kim Hodgson has offered to do nursing shifts to help contain the outbreak
Thirteen people have died in a superbug outbreak at an NHS hospital, it has emerged.
Another 17 patients are being treated in a special isolation ward while non-infected patients have had to be moved to other hospitals up to 50km (30 miles) away.
More staff have been taken on to cope with the crisis at Eastbourne District General Hospital and the trust's chief executive has even offered to do nursing shifts.
Patient groups described the outbreak of clostridium difficile as 'very worrying' and warned it could put people off going for treatment.
'Hospitals have to focus every day on hygiene – if they don't then they're going to get these sort of outbreaks,' said Michael Summers, of the Patients Association.
'It worries patients greatly and several hundred a month put off elective surgery until these outbreaks are solved.'
The hospital revealed there had been 62 cases of C.diff this year – 30 in February alone.
This is much more than the target rate of 19 a month and was blamed on a high number of patients being admitted with respiratory infections.
The 'vast majority' of the 13 victims were described by the hospital as being elderly and frail.
Three of the patients, aged 85 to 91, lost their lives as a direct result of the infection while it was a contributory factor in the ten other cases.
Dr Barry Phillips, director of infection prevention and control, said: 'I would like to offer my condolences to those who have lost loved ones. Can I reassure patients and local people that we have the highest possible infection controls in place at the hospital to manage this current problem.'
The C.diff bug – which lives in the gut – multiplies when exposed to antibiotics, causing severe complications in already frail patients.
PS. This Research Report highlights the importance of Probiotics products that can be bought over the counter, e.g. Actimel or Yakult can prevent C. Difficile and possibly the person’s death.
BMJ, doi: 10.1136/bmj.39231.599815.55, (Published 29 June 2007)
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/bmj … 99815.55v1
research-article
Use of probiotic Lactobacillus preparation to prevent diarrhoea associated with antibiotics: randomised double blind placebo controlled trial
Mary Hickson, research dietitian1, Aloysius L D'Souza, research fellow2, Nirmala Muthu, research nurse3, Thomas R Rogers, professor of clinical microbiology and honorary consultant (Hammersmith Hospitals NHS Trust)4, Susan Want, clinical scientist5, Chakravarthi Rajkumar, senior lecturer2, Christopher J Bulpitt, professor of geriatric medicine2
1 Nutrition and Dietetic Research Group, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College, London W12 0HS, 2 Medicine for the Elderly, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College, London, 3 Hillingdon Hospital, Uxbridge, 4 Department of Infectious Diseases and Immunity, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College School of Medicine, London, 5 Microbiology Department, Hammersmith Hospital NHS Trust, London
Correspondence to: M Hickson mhickson@hhnt.nhs.uk
Important Extract from this research report below
Results 7/57 (12%) of the probiotic group developed diarrhoea associated with antibiotic use compared with 19/56 (34%) in the placebo group (P=0.007). Logistic regression to control for other factors gave an odds ratio 0.25 (95% confidence interval 0.07 to 0.85) for use of the probiotic, with low albumin and sodium also increasing the risk of diarrhoea. The absolute risk reduction was 21.6% (6.6% to 36.6%), and the number needed to treat was 5 (3 to 15). No one in the probiotic group and 9/53 (17%) in the placebo group had diarrhoea caused by C difficile (P=0.001). The absolute risk reduction was 17% (7% to 27%), and the number needed to treat was 6 (4 to 14).
Conclusion
Consumption of a probiotic drink containing L casei, L bulgaricus, and S thermophilus can reduce the incidence of antibiotic associated diarrhoea and C difficile associated diarrhoea. This has the potential to decrease morbidity, healthcare costs, and mortality if used routinely in patients aged over 50.
Important Extract from this research report below
Costs
Using the numbers needed to treat (5 for antibiotic associated diarrhoea, 6 for C difficile associated diarrhoea) we calculated the cost to prevent one case of antibiotic associated diarrhoea. The estimated average cost of the probiotic was £10 ( 14.8; $20) per patient (assuming an average antibiotic course of 10 days plus a further seven days of probiotics, and using current retail prices for Actimel, about £0.30 ( 0.44; $0.60) each). The cost to prevent one case would therefore be £50 ( 74; $100) for antibiotic associated diarrhoea and £60 ( 89; $120) for C difficile associated diarrhoea, excluding dispensing and nursing costs. Evidence suggests that additional treatment costs per patient for C difficile associated diarrhoea are on average $3669 (£1835; 2738) in the United States21 and £4000 ( 5920; $8000) in the United Kingdom22, mainly because of increased length of stay in hospital but also because of the use of vancomycin. Clearly substantial savings could be made by the routine use of probiotics.
PS again. If we consider that as Victims of the Legal Profession, we are exposed to incredible stress and resultant illness. I recently had to have antibiotics for a never ending chest infection. In my case, with having additional professional nursing knowledge, I also took yakult night and morning for the 7 days of antibiotics and for the past two weeks. I had no diarrhoea or gastric upsets.
I think the ordinary person ‘general public’ may very often not have access to this 'professional' knowledge and therefore are not ‘warned’ of the dangers or the research proven benefits of also taking 'probiotics' when taking antibiotics to prevent possible serious consequences, such as C. Difficile, which can be fatal, as in the newspaper article above.
I am hoping the VLPS members will appreciate this health message, i.e. Pro-Bono-Publico (for the good of the public)? J.F.
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Irish Examiner Friday 13/10/2006.
Judge disqualifies self from hearing ‘rate your solicitor’ case: By Vivion Kilfeather.
A HIGH court Judge has disqualified himself from hearing a case taken by a lawyer seeking to discover who is behind an internet website which invites people to “rate” their lawyers.
Mr. Justice Michael Hanna decided it would be in the best interests not to hear the matter on the grounds that any ruling he made might be deemed unfair to one on the parties involved.
In the proceedings, Dublin-based barrister Jayne Maguire claims John Gill, Drumline, Newmarket-on-Fergus, Co. Clare posted defamatory statements about her “of the most offensive nature both personally and professionally” on the website www.rateyoursolicitor.com
The High Court previously made an order directing that defamatory material be removed from the website.
The judge made his decision after reading an affidavit from Mr. Gill, which included the names of many people in the legal profession.
The judge said he had knowledge of two of those mentioned.
The first was a solicitor who was in college with him, although he had not spoken to that person in 30 years.
The second person, a barrister was a friend and former pupil of his.
He said that “the highest possible standards must be maintained” by members of the judiciary.
“Not only must justice be done, but justice must be seen to be done,” he said.
The judge said that not only would he have had to decide the case, but he would have to rule on the ‘admissibility’ of Mr. Gill’s affidavit.
Photograph with caption: Mr. Justice Michael Hanna: former pupil on affidavit.
In order to the fair to Mr. Gill he said it was his “instinct” that he should not hear it.
Should he have to rule against Mr. Gill he did not want him to take exception to this decision.
Mr. Gill denies any involvement with the website.
He has also alleged that Ms. Maguire had told him it was a colleague who had posted the material complained of.
He told the court that he had no problem with the judge disqualifying himself.
“I just want to get justice,” he said.
The matter has been adjourned, and will be heard by another judge at a later date.
PS. The quote:- ‘The judge said he had knowledge of two of those mentioned.’ Would this not apply to every lawyer that we ‘Victim of the Legal Profession Society’ (VLPS) are seeking justice?
How can the statement by judge Hanna:- “Not only must justice be done, but justice must be seen to be done,” ever be achieved by VLPS in the island of Ireland? J.F.
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